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TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW
VOLUME XIV 1983 NUMBER 2
"TAKING" A CONSTITUTIONAL LOOK AT
THE STATE BAR OF TEXAS PROPOSAL
TO COLLECT INTEREST ON ATTORNEY-
CLIENT TRUST ACCOUNTS
by
Thomas E. Baker*
and
Robert E. Wood, Jr.**
I. INTRODUCTION
In December 1981 a special committee of the State Bar of
Texas was commissioned to study the possibility of instituting a
program to generate interest on clients' trust accounts for the ben-
efit of bar-related public service projects.' The committee was
somewhat disarmingly called the "Client Protection Committee,"'
* Associate Professor of Law, Texas Tech University; B.S., Florida State University,
1974; J.D., Holland Law Center, University of Florida, 1977.
** Professor of Law and Associate Dean, Texas Tech University;, B.A., Texas Tech Uni-
versity, 1965; J.D., Vanderbilt University, 1968.
1. The Client Protection Committee appointed by State Bar President Wayne Fisher
was composed of: Edgar H. Keltner, Jr., Fort Worth (chairman); James W. Wray, Jr.,
Corpus Christi (vice-chairman); Robert H. Thomas, Dallas (board advisor); Tom Fleming,
Brownsville (alternate board advisor); John Gilbert, Angleton; Bob Roberts, Austin; Pat
Peyton, Beaumont; W. John Glancy, Dallas; John C. Akard, El Paso; Graham H. McCul-
lough, Harlingen; Robert L. Byrd and Robert L. Sonfield, Jr., Houston; Robert E. Wood,
Lubbock; and Richard B. Moore, San Antonio. Although coauthor Wood was a member of
the committee, the views expressed here are the authors' alone.
2. There is some explanation for the seeming misnomer. In the original charge to the
committee, the "Florida Plan" of interest on trust accounts was described as augmenting
the Florida Bar's Clients' Security Fund. This was later found to be erroneous. Indeed, sup-
port of the fund was one of the purposes denied to the Florida plan. See infra note 23.
Members of the committee originally understood that their purpose was to find a funding
source for the Texas Client Security Fund. Soon, however, it became evident that the coin-
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but the focus of its attention soon became the Interest on Trust
Accounts programs recently instituted in Florida' and California.4
In its deliberations' on a Texas Interest on Trust Accounts Pro-
gram (TEX-IOTA) the committee recognized the existence of nu-
merous complex issues of tax law,6 trust law 7professional respon-
sibility,8 constitutional law," and even more complicated questions
of politics," public relations," and practical implementation. 2
Nevertheless, on September 8, 1982, the committee unanimously
endorsed a report recommending the adoption of a program under
which interest on attorney-client trust accounts that are small in
mittee was to study the implementation of the interest on trust accounts program to sup-
port a variety of bar-related public service projects. The original misnomer is doubly ironic
because the proposed Texas plan raises several difficult questions concerning the constitu-
tional rights of clients.
3. See In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN.,
Integration Rule 11.02(4)(d) (West Supp. 1982). The Florida Plan is described from several
points of view in the February 1982 issue of The Florida Bar Journal. See also infra Appen-
dix B (comparing Florida plan with those of California, Idaho, and Maryland).
4. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6210-6228 (West Supp. 1982). See also infra Ap-
pendix B (comparing California plan with those of Florida, Idaho, and Maryland).
5. The committee met three times prior to the September 8, 1982, telephone confer-
ence call during which the report was adopted for submission to the Executive Committee of
the Texas Bar. Membership on the committee changed slightly; Ed Keltner was unable to
serve and Jim Wray became chairman and Robert E. Wood was appointed vice-chairman.
Thomas H. Watkins became the new board advisor and John N. Jackson, Harold F. Klein-
man, and Robert C. Morton, all of Dallas, were appointed as new members after the adop-
tion of the September 8, 1982, report.
6. These include attribution of the income to the client under the assignment of in-
come doctrine. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 117-20 (1940); Lyon & Eustice, Assign-
ment of Income: Fruit and Tree as Irrigated by the P.G. Lake Case, 17 TAX L. REv. 293
(1962); Yohlin, Assignment and Deflection of Income, 20 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 147 (1962).
7. A potential conflict of interest problem exists when an attorney is forced to decide
whether to place his client's funds in the IOTA account with interest going to the bar desig-
nate or in another interest-bearing account from which the client would receive the pro-
ceeds. In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389, 399 (Fla. 1981) (Boyd, J., dissent-
ing); Letter from Chief Justice Joseph Branch, Supreme Court of North Carolina, to John
Wishart Campbell, President, North Carolina State Bar (April 13, 1982).
8. If the client has a constitutionally protected right in the interest on his funds, the
attorney could not, of course, use them or direct their disbursal to the bar designate. See
supra note 7; State Bar of Texas, Rules and Code of Professional Responsibility DR 9-102
(1973).
9. Due process and "taking" questions dominated the committee's concern.
10. Should the implementing authority be the supreme court or the legislature? Will
the banks or the consumer bar oppose it?
11. How can the program be sold to the bar? To the legislature? To the public?
12. Should the program be voluntary or mandatory? What organization should be the
recipient? What programs should be supported? What efforts would be needed to assure
that existing bank-attorney relationships are not strained or altered?
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amount or held for short duration would be paid to a charitable
organization affiliated with the State Bar of Texas."3 Despite the
unanimous consent to the report, at least two members of the com-
mittee noted serious reservations concerning the constitutionality
of the program as recommended.14 We will consider the constitu-
tional issues in this article.
II. IOTA DEVELOPMENT
TEX-IOTA1' had its genesis long ago and far away. During
the 1960s the search for sources to fund the operations of the or-
ganized bar and delivery of legal services led the bars of several
Australian' s and Canadian1 7 jurisdictions to develop the IOTA
concept.1 8 In December 1976, after five years of study, the Florida
Bar filed a formal petition with the Florida Supreme Court re-
questing the adoption of a program to utilize interest on clients'
trust funds for public programs designed to improve the adminis-
tration of justice." After modifications dictated by legal obstacles
13. It was felt that neither the State Bar of Texas nor the Texas Bar Foundation
would be an appropriate intermediary for the program because of federal tax problems. The
vehicle suggested for preliminary investigation was Legal Services to the Poor in Texas, Inc.,
an essentially dormant nonprofit organization affiliated with the State Bar of Texas.
14. Vice-chairman Robert E. Wood and member Bob Roberts, the only members of a
subcommittee appointed on February 19, 1982, to study the constitutional and statutory
aspects of and property rights involved in the program, again raised their concern about
constitutional issues, but approved the report.
15. In an interestingly subtle and probably subconscious fashion, the Florida Supreme
Court changed from identifying the subject of the program as "interest on clients' trust
funds," In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 356 So. 2d 799, 800 (Fla. 1978), to "interest on
lawyers' trust accouts," In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389, 389 (Fla. 1981). To
avoid problems of semantics we have chosen the more neutral and now widely used term
"interest on trust accounts" to describe the subject matter of these programs and have
adopted TEX-IOTA as an acronym.
16. The Australian States of Victoria, New South Wales, South Australia, Queensland,
and the Australian Capital Territory have developed programs. Comment, A Source of Rev-
enue for the Improvement of Legal Services, Part I: An Analysis of the Plans in Foreign
Countries and Florida Allowing the Use of Clients' Funds Held by Attorneys in Non-Inter-
est-Bearing Trust Accounts to Support Programs of the Organized Bar, 10 ST. MARY's L.J.
539, 542-43 (1979). Victoria was the first, in 1964. Id. at 543.
17. Ontario, Alberta, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia,
Saskatchewan, and British Columbia. Id. at 545 n.57.
18. For an excellent history of the development of IOTA programs and the Florida
plan through the 1978 order, see generally id. at 550-63. See also England & Carlisle, His-
tory of Interest on Trust Accounts Program, 56 FLA. B.J. 101, 101-03 (1982) (developments
up to 1981 revisions in Florida).
19. In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 356 So. 2d 799, 800 (Fla. 1978).
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and public comment, a final plan was adopted in Florida, effective
September 1, 1981.20 The Florida plan provides that, on a volun-
tary basis, attorneys and law firms may establish interest-bearing
checking accounts with clients' funds which are nominal in amount
or to be held for a short period of time with the interest (net of
charges) to be paid quarterly to the Florida Bar Foundation, Inc.,
for use in providing legal aid to the poor, funding student loans,
and improving the administration of justice.2 Necessary to imple-
mentation of the plan was procurement of regulatory approval in
three critical areas: taxability of the income;22 the charitable na-
ture of the purposes to which the funds would be put;2 - and recog-
nition that banks could open such NOW accounts. 2' The Internal
Revenue Service provided the first two clearances26 and the Board
20. In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389, 397 (Fla. 1981). By October 1982
fewer than 2000 attorneys had joined the Florida plan, but $350,000 had been collected.
Rinaman, President's Page, 56 FLA. B.J. 677, 677 (1982).
21. FLA. STAT. ANN., Integration Rule 11.02(4)(d) (West Supp. 1982). See Barker, Dis-
persing the Revenue: Present Options and Needs, 56 FLA. B.J. 122, 123-26 (1982).
22. The assignment of income doctrine provides that income from property is taxable
to the owner of the property. The doctrine was unveiled in Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111
(1930), and protects against shrinkage of a tax base which might occur through attribution
of taxable earnings to entities at a lower marginal tax rate. The key to determining tax
liability is ascertaining who has control over the fund, who directs that the fund produce
income, and who determines the recipient(s) of the disbursements. See Helvering v. Horst,
311 U.S. 112 (1940).
23. The Florida plan originally sought approval to use the funds for seven purposes:
adequate delivery of legal services to all members of the public; augmentation of the Clients'
Security Fund; funding of better grievance procedures; providing legal aid to the poor; pro-
viding student loans; improving the administration of justice; and such other programs for
the benefit of the public as specifically approved by the court from time to time. In re
Interest on Trust Accounts, 356 So. 2d 799, 811 (Fla. 1978). Upon receiving opposition from
the Internal Revenue Service, the first three of the seven proposed uses were withdrawn.
See In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 372 So. 2d 67, 68 (Fla. 1979).
24. NOW accounts were not widely available in 1978 when the Florida plan was first
adopted. By September 1981 they became available in most instances when the "entire ben-
eficial interest" in the account belonged to an individual or a nonprofit entity. See infra
notes 28 & 39.
25. By removing client control and shifting the election to participate from the client
to the attorney, the Florida Bar Foundation was able to obtain the desired tax treatment,
namely, that the interest generated on these accounts was not includable in the gross in-
come of the client. See Rev. Rul. 81-209, 1981-2 C.B. 16. Florida withdrew its request to use
funds for the Clients' Security Fund, improvement of grievance procedures, and delivery of
legal services to all members of the public. See generally Rev. Rul. 71-506, 1971-2 C.B. 233
(city bar association that primarily directs its activities to the promotion and protection of
the practice of law may not be reclassified as an exempt charitable or educational organiza-
tion under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)); Rev. Rul. 71-504, 1971-2 C.B. 231 (city medical society that
primarily directs its activities to promotion of common business purpose of members may
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of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, construing regula-
tions26 under the new Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act, 7 provided the last.'
During the extended period of time between presentation and
implementation of the Florida plan other states moved in the same
direction.2e In 1981 the California Legislature enacted a similar
plan.30 The California plan is mandatory with legal aid 'as the sole
not be reclassified as exempt educational or charitable organization under I.R.C. §
501(c)(3)). But see Virginia Professional Standards Review Found. v. Blumenthal, 466 F.
Supp. 1164 (D.D.C. 1979) (nonprofit corporation established and performing services as pro-
fessional standards review organization pursuant to Social Security Act is entitled to tax-
exempt status); Kentucky Bar Found., Inc. v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 65 (1982) (nonprofit
organization created to accumulate funds to acquire land and construct building for bar
associaton did not destroy tax-exempt status of bar foundation); Professional Standards Re-
view Org., Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 240 (1980) (nonprofit organization created to en-
sure economical health care and reduce unnecessary spending did not destroy tax-exempt
status).
26. 12 C.F.R. § 217.157 (1982).
27. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-221, §§ 303, 306, 94 Stat. 132, 146-47 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a)
(Supp. IV 1980)).
28. Letter from Michael Bradfield to Donald M. Middlebrooks (October 15, 1981), re-
printed in Middlebrooks, The Interest on Trust Accounts Program-Mechanics of its Op-
eration, 56 FLA. B.J. 115, 117 (1982).
29. During -this period the state bars in Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, Ohio, and Pennsylvania appointed com-
mittees to study the IOTA concept. ABA STAF TASK FORCE, INTEREST ON CLIENT TRUST
FUND2, CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF INTEREST ON CLIENT TRUST FUNDS (December 1, 1981)
[hereinafter cited as CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY]. Massachusetts and New Jersey recom-
mended that no program be implemented because computer technology was available to
permit allocation of interest to individual clients. Id.
North Carolina is the only state thus far to reject IOTA on the basis of unconstitution-
ality. The North Carolina Supreme Court refused to certify proposed amendments to Canon
9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of the North Carolina State Bar
on the grounds that without notice to the clients the regulations could be:
(1) in conflict with the taking of property clause of the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, which is made applicable to the states by the Four-
teenth Amendment, under the holding of the United States Supreme Court in
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980);
(2) in conflict with the taking of property provision contained in Article I, Section
19 of the North Carolina Constitution, under the holding of the Supreme Court of
North Carolina in McMillan v. Robeson County, 262 N.C. 413 (1964); and
(3) contrary to public policy relating to the fiduciary relationship between attor-
ney and client, under the holding of the Supreme Court of North Carolina in Hall
v. Shippers Express, 235 N.C. 38 (1951).
Letter from Chief Justice Joseph Branch, Supreme Court of North Carolina, to John Wi-
shart Campbell, President, North Carolina State Bar, at 12 (April 13, 1982).
30. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 6210-6228 (West Supp. 1982).
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recipient.s' While the ABA has not officially taken a position on
these programs, an ABA Staff Task Force on Interest on Client
Trust Funds has been formed and is monitoring and supporting
proposals of other state and local bar associations.3 2 A recent For-
mal Opinion of the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Pro-
fessional Responsibility concluded that the Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility permits lawyers to participate in such
programs.33
After reviewing the plans used in other jurisdictions, the
Texas Client Protection Committee made seven specific recom-
mendations to the Executive Committee of the State Bar in Sep-
tember 1982:"
(1) Under the program, each attorney would decide, as is pres-
ently the case, whether trust funds are to be invested at interest
for a client. Only funds that are sufficiently small in amount or to
be held for such a short period that they could not reasonably be
invested for the benefit of the client would be included in the
program.
(2) The program should be created by rule of the Supreme
Court of Texas as done by the Supreme Court of Florida. In the
alternative, the program should be enacted by the Texas Legisla-
31. Id. For a comparison of the plans now in effect in California, Florida, Idaho, and
Maryland, see Appendix B.
32. A report to the Board of Governors of the American Bar Association dated July
26, 1982, offers the following breakdown of action by the states:
SUMMARY STATUS RECAP July 15, 1982
Approved by court/legislature Cal., Fla., Idaho, Md.
Endorsed by bar Colo., Hawaii, Ill., Me., Mass., Minn., N.Y.,
Or., Va.
No action La., Miss., Utah, Vt.
Disapproved Ga., N.C., W.Va., N.J.
Under study Alaska, Ark., Ariz., Conn., Del., Ind., Iowa,
Kan., Ky., Mich., Mo., Mont., Neb., Nev.,
N.D., N.J., N.M., N.Y., Ohio, Okla., Pa., R.I.,
S.C., S.D., Tenn., Tex., Wash., Wis., Wyo.
ABA TASK FORCE AND ADVISORY BOARD, INTERESr ON LAwYER TRuST AccouNTs, REPORT TO
THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS app. C (July 26, 1982). New Jersey rejected the idea in October
1979 because of available technology, but is now restudying. See id. at C-3; CHRONOLOGICAL
SUMMARY, supra note 29.
33. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 348 (1982).
34. The vote on the recommendations was made by conference telephone call before
the report had been fully circulated. At least one conferee, vice-chairman Robert E. Wood,
received a copy of the report only as the conference call was being placed.
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ture as was done by the California Legislature."5
(3) If possible, the program should be mandatory for all attor-
neys. Under a mandatory program, an attorney who did not place
client trust funds in an account bearing interest for the benefit of
the client would be required to place trust funds in an interest-
bearing NOW account with the proceeds paid to a charitable or-
ganization described in paragraph (5) below. If it is not possible to
establish a mandatory program, the program should be voluntary
with the State Bar actively encouraging participation.
(4) There should be an exception for trust funds that arise
from the deposit of drafts that are not fully credited within a short
period (under Federal Reserve or other comparable rules) to the
bank in which the drafts are deposited. Once such drafts have been
fully credited, the resulting trust funds (if they have not already
been paid out) should be subject to the program.
(5) The recipient of the interest payments on the trust funds
should be a tax-exempt' charitable organization controlled by a
board of directors comprised of the Chief Justice of the Texas Su-
preme Court, the President of the State Bar, and other members
appointed by the President of the State Bar and approved by the
Board of Directors of the State Bar.
(6) Funds generated under the program should be used for
three purposes: (a) to provide legal services to the poor; (b) to pro-
vide funds for the client security fund; and (c) to improve griev-
ance procedures."
(7) The program should be implemented only after receiving a
private ruling from the Internal Revenue Service that clients will
35. The Executive Committee of the State Bar later decided that implementation
through the supreme court would be impracticable, and the matter was referred to the State
Bar staff to draft legislation for inclusion in the State Bar's legislative package for the 1983
Legislature. The proposed draft, attached as Appendix A, was for legislative enactment with
supreme court implementation. It also changed the purposes for which funds could be used.
See infra note 36. The changes, made after this article was submitted for publication, are
not fully incorporated herein; however, they do not affect the article's constitutional analysis
in any substantial way.
36. After submission of this article, a proposed draft of legislation enacting TEX-
IOTA was presented to the State Bar Board of Directors. See infra Appendix A. It requires
the supreme court to promulgate rules and regulations to implement the program. The bill
follows the committee recommendations except it defines as its purposes: (a) legal services
to the indigent in civil matters, (b) improvement of the administration of justice, and (c)
other law-related programs for the benefit of the public as are expressly approved from time
to time by the supreme court for exclusively public purposes. Id.
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not incur tax liability on the interest involved. It is expected that
this ruling can be obtained since the Internal Revenue Service has
already issued a published ruling to this effect regarding the Flor-
ida program. 7
This is the present status of TEX-IOTA. We believe that
there are three critical issues essential to the operation of TEX-
IOTA to which the committee did not give sufficient attention.
The first concerns the theoretical underpinnings of the plan-the
inability or impracticability of allocating small amounts of interest
to the individual client."8 The second issue involves the legal avail-
37. The committee also recognized that an additional ruling should be obtained be-
cause the last two charitable purposes proposed in paragraph (6) were not approved in the
Florida program.
38. As represented to the Florida Supreme Court in 1982:
The basic premise underlying the Court's adoption of the Interest on Trust
Account Program is that lawyers' commingled trust accounts are largely made up
of multiple deposits which are held for a short period of time and are so small in
amount that it is not practicable to allocate earnings on the account to the indi-
vidual client.
Response Brief of the Florida Bar Foundation to the Written Submissions of Interested
Persons at 2, In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1981). Advances in
technology may undermine this premise. Indeed, some jurisdictions have concluded that the
present availability of just this capacity is sufficient reason to reject the IOTA program.
Maryland, Massachusetts, and New Jersey, as early as 1978, concluded that computerized
subaccounting was possible to allocate interest to individual clients. See supra note 32.
Almost no investigation was done by the Texas Client Protection Committee on this
issue, even though it was raised on at least three occasions. The matter of technological
elimination of the allocation difficulties was raised at the second meeting of the Client Pro-
tection Committee in Austin on April 30, 1982. Then-president-elect of the State Bar Orrin
Johnson suggested that the committee expedite its proposal because technology could undo
the program sometime in the near future. It was raised again in a letter of May 3, 1982, from
Robert E. Wood to James W. Wray with copies to the committee. The letter read, in part:
I submit to you that we have done precious little investigation to ascertain if
that premise is correct. It would be embarrassing to all concerned if we got deeply
into this project only to have a series of bankers testify that technology has al-
ready rendered this basic premise false. In 1978, the Maryland Bar Association
studied the possibility of implementing an IOTA program and concluded that the
technology was then available. In fact, detailed plans were submitted by banks
and savings and loan associations. If I heard Orrin Johnson correctly, he suggested
at the very least that we'd better hurry because technology could undo the pro-
gram sometime in the near future.
Letter from Robert E. Wood to James W. Wray, Jr. (May 3, 1982). No one was commis-
sioned to study the matter. At the committee's meeting in Austin on May 26, 1982, informa-
tion from a major bank holding company in Texas that the technology was available was
discounted as inconclusive, without any new or comprehensive research being commissioned.
This impracticability justification resembles the common-law property doctrine of con-
fusion, defined as an intermixture of goods in which the property can no longer be identified
with an owner. Unlike the common-law concept which gave each owner a pro rata share of
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ability of interest-bearing NOW accounts to serve as vehicles for
the plan.39 The third issue concerns constitutional rights of the cli-
the mixture, the Bar would give all to a third party. Furthermore, the doctrine (not the
justification) has no application to money. R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY §
6.8, at 62-63 (1975). See also Farrow v. Farrow, 238 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1951, no writ) (commingling of money not possible when amount owned by each claimant is
known).
39. Obviously, an interest-bearing account with demand-like features is essential to
the establishment of IOTA. Florida obtained an opinion of General Counsel for the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System that their program was eligible for NOW ac-
counts. See supra note 28. The conclusion contained in that opinion that "[s]ince no entity
other than the foundation has any interest to the income derived from funds maintained
under the Program, it would appear that. . . the Foundation hold [sic] the entire beneficial
interest to the funds" is not one which is easily reconciled with statutory language and
policy. See id.
Since the post-depression amendments of the Federal Reserve Act and the creation of
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, insured banks (most banks in the United
States) have been proscribed from paying interest on checking accounts. See 12 U.S.C. §§
371a, 1828(g)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). This was one of the historic distinctions between commer-
cial banks and savings or thrift institutions: the widespread offering of demand accounts by
banks and the general absence of third party devices in the savings or thrift institutions. In
1970 Consumers Savings Bank of Worcester, Massachusetts, developed an account which
would allow its customers to transfer money from their savings account to third party pay-
ees by means of a negotiable order of withdrawal. Consumers Say. Bank v. Commissioner of
Banks, 361 Mass. 717, 282 N.E.2d 416 (1972). In mid-1973 Connecticut became the first
state to allow "thrifts" to offer checking accounts by legislative action. See CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 36-104d (West 1981). Other New England states followed. To meet this chal-
lenge 12 U.S.C. § 1832 was adopted in 1973 to permit NOW accounts by insured institutions
in Massachusetts and New Hampshire. Pub. L. No. 93-100, § 2, 87 Stat. 342 (1973),
amended by Pub. L. No. 96-221, §§ 303, 306, 94 Stat. 132, 146-47 (1980). Connecticut,
Rhode Island, Maine, and Vermont were included in 1976. Pub. L. No. 94-222, § 2(a), 90
Stat. 197 (1976), amended by Pub. L. No. 96-221, §§ 303, 306, 94 Stat. 132, 146-47 (1980).
The provision subsequently was extended to New York, Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 1301, 92 Stat.
3712 (1978), amended by Pub. L. No. 96-221, §§ 303, 306, 94 Stat. 132, 146-47 (1980), and
New Jersey, Pub. L. No. 96-161, § 106, 93 Stat. 1235 (1979), amended by Pub. L. No. 96-
221, §§ 303, 306, 94 Stat. 132, 146-47 (1980). This privilege was subsequently extended na-
tionwide, effective December 31, 1980. See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Mone-
tary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, §§ 303, 306, 94 Stat. 132, 146-47 (1980) (codi-
fied as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1832 (Supp. IV 1980)). The statute specifies that the NOW
account privilege "shall apply only with respect to deposits or accounts which consist solely
of funds in which the entire beneficial interest is held by one or more individuals or by an
organization which is operated primarily for religious, philanthropic, charitable, educational,
or other similar purposes and which is not operated for profit." 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(2)
(Supp. IV 1980) (emphasis added).
Does the conclusion reached by the Federal Reserve that IOTA funds may be main-
tained in NOW accounts suggest that the client has no beneficial interest in the account?
Such a result would be suspect. The Florida Attorney General appears to have indulged in
the same ipse dixit technique rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Webb's
Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980), in concluding that the
Foundation is the owner of the beneficial interest because it has the right to income, and it
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ents. We are confident that in the political arena the first two is-
sues will play a prominent part in the TEX-IOTA debate. We are
not so sure about the constitutional issues. In this article, we hope
to begin to give them the attention that issues of such importance
deserve.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF TEX-IOTA
In taking a constitutional look at the Bar's proposal to collect
interest on attorney-client trust accounts, our looking glass is fed-
eral, not state, constitutional law.40 Within the federal perspective,
we will describe general constitutional restraints in passing fashion
and focus chiefly on the applicable "taking" analysis. Our theme is
not that TEX-IOTA's scheme is constitutional or unconstitutional.
Our limited purpose is to identify and describe the constitutional
issues which should be an important part of any thorough evalua-
tion of such a proposal. These issues largely have been overlooked
in other jurisdictions and we are concerned that Texas should not
follow similar shortcuts. Justice Holmes' warning seems most ap-
posite: "We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire
to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving
the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying
for the change." 41
has the right to income because the program so provides.
One interesting aspect of this is worthy of note. If the Board of Governors will approve
NOW accounts where the interest is to be paid to a nonprofit organization, then a new
method of charitable giving has been created. Any partnership or corporation for profit
could place its transaction accounts in NOW accounts with a charitable donee designated
for the interest generated thereon. Income would be attributable to the business owner of
the account, but a concomitant charitable deduction generally would be available. The effect
would be to transfer the interest from the banks (which would otherwise be paying none) to
the charity.
40. Provisions in the various state constitutions, similar to the United States Constitu-
tion, are given different meanings. See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. Rav. 489 (1977); Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive
Due Process in the States, 34 MINN. L. REv. 91 (1950); Note, State Constitutional Limita-
tions on the Power of Eminent Domain, 77 HAsv. L. RE.v. 717 (1964). In most relevant
aspects, corresponding provisions of the Texas Constitution coincide with the federal ver-
sion. See Tzx. CoNST. art. I, §§ 17, 19. The procedure is different but the substantive princi-
ples are much the same. See Trinity River Auth. v. Chain, 437 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
41. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
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A. State Action
The most important constitutional guarantees of individual
rights protect against governmental action, state or federal. "2 The
doctrine of state action has been described as,4'a conceptual disas-
ter area" ' and we need not launch a long exploration of that four-
teenth amendment terrain. From the beginning, the Supreme
Court has held that only state action triggered the protections of
section one of that amendment." For our purpose, modern state
action may be assessed by inquiring whether the role of the state
rule being challenged is positive, negative, or neutral. 5
42. The three most notable exceptions to this proposition are the protections afforded
one individual against other individuals by the thirteenth amendment, the federal govern-
ment's responsibilities for federal elections, and the right to travel. J. WILLIAMS, CONSTITU-
TIONAL ANALYSIS 42-45 (1979). Except perhaps for a bizarre and hypothetical claim that the
right to travel is somehow hampered by the present proposal, these protections are obvi-
ously irrelevant to our discussion.
43. Black, The Supreme Court 1966 Term-Forward: "State Action," Equal Protec-
tion, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HAIv. L. REv. 69, 95 (1967).
44. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17-18 (1883). See also United States v. Harris,
106 U.S. 629, 638 (1883) (purpose of first section of the fourteenth amendment is to place a
restraint upon the action of the states); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1880) (prohibi-
tions of the fourteenth amendment are directed to the states and Congress is empowered to
enforce them against state action); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880) (prohibitions of
fourteenth amendment have exclusive reference to state action); United States v. Cruik-
shank, 92 U.S. 542, 554 (1876) (fourteenth amendment adds nothing to the rights of one
citizen as against another). See generally Glennon & Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the
Fourteenth Amendment "State Action" Requirement, 1976 Sup. CT. REV. 221, 221 (Bill of
Rights and fourteenth amendment apply only to those acts connected to state action).
45. An intellectual debt for much of this state action analysis is owed Professor Lau-
rence H. Tribe and his course "Advanced Constitutional Law I-Law and Litigation:
Emerging Theories," part of the curriculum at the Harvard Law School 1982 Program of
Instruction for Lawyers. Professor Tribe has turned analytical frustration into a framework
of analysis. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 18-1, at 1149 (1977).
In addition to the requirement of state action, the Constitution requires that the chal-
lenger have standing. The state court standing of clients as owners of the property affected
by TEX-IOTA can scarcely be contested. It is usually required only that the plaintiff be a
"person aggrieved," a person whose interests are adversely affected, or a person having a
special interest in the matter. See Scott v. Board of Adjustment, 405 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. 1966);
City of San Antonio v. Stumburg, 70 Tex. 366, 7 S.W. 754 (1888); San Antonio Conservation
Soc'y v. City of San Antonio, 250 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1952, writ
ref'd). Cf. Davis, Standing to Challenge Governmental Action, 39 MINN. L. REV. 353, 359
(1955) (analyzing model state standing requirements in challenges to governmental action);
Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 HARv. L. REV. 255, 289-95
(1961) (canvassing state standing requirements for judicial review of governmental action).
Even the attorney may have sufficient involvement to establish a justiciable interest in liti-
gating the constitutionality of TEX-IOTA. See Touchy v. Houston Legal Found., 432
S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1968) (attorney has standing to enjoin conduct of nonlawyers which is
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In a direct challenge of the state statute which establishes
TEX-IOTA and works the damage, state action is obvious and no
formal inquiry into the issue is required." Arguably, state action is
somewhat less apparent when the state statute is a positive rule on
which private actors rely. Although the state action issue often is
ignored when the validity of the relevant statute is not a serious
issue, the existence of the statute alone may establish state action
even when the ultimate injury is done by a private individual.47
Viewing TEX-IOTA as a positive rule which merely would en-
courage and facilitate private action by the designated private
foundation and attorneys is sufficient to satisfy the state action re-
quirement when the rule itself is challenged. The state may not be
responsible for the private action of the attorney, which the statute
merely facilitates or enforces, especially if TEX-IOTA is not
mandatory. Nevertheless, the facilitation or enforcement is the ac-
tion of the state along with the enactment itself. Thus, a facial or
an as applied constitutional challenge of the TEX-IOTA statute
would reach the fourteenth amendment merits.48
Second, TEX-IOTA may be viewed along the negative axis of
state action calculus. Just as a positive tilt in the state rule may be
state action, a negative tilt may engage the fourteenth amendment
if the tilt is the object of the challenge. When the injurious act is
performed by a private party who has been threatened or coerced
into acting, the threat or coercion itself may be challenged.49 If
demeaning to the legal profession). Accord Depew v. Wichita Retail Credit Ass'n, 141 Kan.
481, 42 P.2d 214 (1935); Dworken v. Apartment House Owner's Ass'n, 38 Ohio Ct. App. 265,
176 N.E. 577 (1930).
46. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
47. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (federal statute was state action and
upheld); Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1979) (state statute was state action and
upheld).
48. The same conclusion would follow if the Texas Supreme Court were the state actor
that promulgated TEX-IOTA, so long as the challenge targeted the rule. See supra note 35.
Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (state court enforcement of enforceable common-
law private arrangement was state action). But see Armenta v. Nussbaum, 519 S.W.2d 673,
677 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (self-help is not state action and
cannot be brought within fourteenth amendment).
49. See Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981). The state's refusal to pay for indigent
putative father's blood test in Little might have passed constitutional muster in and of it-
self. Cf. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). The negative state tilt which also provided
that the illegitimate's mother must bring a paternity action to qualify for welfare benefits,
however, went too far. Compare Blum v. Yaretsky, 102 S. Ct. 2777 (1982) (nursing home's
decision to discharge or transfer Medicaid patients to lower level of care not state action)
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TEX-IOTA is mandatory, the negative tilt could be challenged by
suing the state entity charged with enforcement, objecting to the
statutory coercion of and threatened disciplinary action against
attorneys.
The most ambiguous of the three state action roles occurs
when the state rule lurks in the background of a regime of private
action. Such neutral rules may be held void on their face5" or as
applied within the appropriate state-created context,51 or upheld
facially and in application. 2 The neutral rule may be sufficient
state involvement to allow a plaintiff to invoke the fourteenth
amendment in at least two situations. To show that the seemingly
neutral rule of dubious validity is the basis of the cause of action,
the notion that the injurious act is really private must be con-
tested.53 In our context, the injurious act will not be really private
since the attorney's decision will be foreordained by the state deci-
sion to make TEX-IOTA mandatory. Alternatively, the act may be
attributed to the state on the basis of the private actor's position,
his state connection, and the function being performed-the pri-
vate actor is the state in sheep's clothing. 4 Either the private at-
torney who sets up the account or the designated private founda-
tion that receives the interest may be viewed as a state
functionary.5
with Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 102 S. Ct. 2745 (1982) (statutory scheme for prejudgment
attachment was state action although private party's misuse of state law was not).
50. See Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964).
51. See Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981). Compare Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,
102 S. Ct. 2745 (1982) (corporate creditor and president acted under color of state law in
depriving debtor of his property) with Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (state's
mere acquiescence in a private action does not convert such action into that of the state).
52. See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1979); Armenta v. Nussbaum, 519
S.W.2d 673 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
53. Generally, this depends on how the court views the record. See Blum v. Yaretsky,
102 S. Ct. 2777, 2791-94 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
54. See Screwes v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). Often it is difficult to discern
when there is sufficient state involvement in the background. For a time, a symbiotic rela-
tionship between the private actor and the state went a long way toward establishing state
action. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961). It is unclear how
much of this theory survives. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 102 S. Ct. 2777 (1982); Rendell-Baker v.
Kohn, 102 S. Ct. 2764 (1982).
55. There is a corollary to the neutral rule of state action which probably does not
apply and may be of doubtful validity today. When a private actor who is not the state in
disguise is privately motivated and there is neither a positive nor negative state tilt there is
no state action. The Constitution may still apply, however, because of a subsequent state
imprimatur placed on the private act. See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Shelley
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B. General Substantive Protections
Just as there are alternative bases for invoking the fourteenth
amendment, once invoked there are alternative substantive protec-
tions that could apply to TEX-IOTA. Each substantive protection
of the fourteenth amendment has its own version of judicial re-
view.5 Our limited purpose is to identify the constitutional issues
which TEX-IOTA raises and summarily describe the appropriate
judicial analysis. TEX-IOTA raises potential issues under the priv-
ileges and immunities, due process, and equal protection clauses
which deserve at least brief attention.57 Our emphasis, however,
will be on the "taking" issue.
1. Privileges and Immunities
The privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth
amendment"8 is no longer regarded too seriously and merits mini-
mal attention. The clause does not protect all individual rights or
even all those specified in the Bill of Rights.6 9 In fact, the Supreme
Court has held that the right to deposit money in banks is not
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Obviously, the private actors, the attorney and designated
foundation, have little if any purely private motive to collect the interest for public works.
TEX-IOTA seems so obvious an example of a positive or negative tilt, however, that it is
unnecessary to reach this corollary.
56. The paradox that the theory of judicial review establishes and, in turn, is estab-
lished by the substantive protections is a principle at once so basic and so unsettled that it
has plagued succeeding generations of scholars. Ours is no exception. See J. CHOPER, JUDI-
cIAL REviEw AND THE NATIONAL POLrTCAL PROCESS (1980); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRuST
(1980). For some insights into the theory of judicial review in the presently considered con-
text, see generally Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County In Perspective: Thirty Years of
Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 SUP. CT. REv. 63; Kratovil & Harrison, Eminent
Domain-Policy and Concept, 42 CALW. L. Rzv. 596 (1954); Lavine, Extent of Judicial In-
quiry into Power of Eminent Domain, 28 S. CAL. L. Rev. 369 (1955).
57. These constitutional provisions play a secondary role in expropriation law. See
Dunham, supra note 56, at 69-70. The constitutional values underlying these clauses assume
a more significant role in the policy and application of expropriation law. Michelman, Prop-
erty, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation"
Law, 80 HARV. L. Rev. 1165, 1182, 1195 (1967).
58. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The article IV privileges and immunities is best
understood as "a specialized type of equal protection provision which guarantees that all
classifications which burden persons because they are not citizens of the state must reasona-
bly relate to legitimate state or local purposes." J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONST-
TUrIONAL LAW 378 (1978) [hereinafter cited as J. NowAK].
59. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 584-88 (1900); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 36, 74-81 (1872).
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within the protection of the clause. 0 Thus, clients could not invoke
the privileges and immunities clause with much hope of success.
2. Equal Protection
The development of the equal protection clause has been the
converse of the privileges and immunities clause. A half century
ago, Justice Holmes called an equal protection claim "the usual
last resort of constitutional arguments." 61 Yet, "[tioday [the] equal
protection doctrine has become the Court's chief instrument for
invalidating state laws." 2 Any transfer of private property to the
government affects only that particular property. Because each
such transfer thus necessarily discriminates,6 equal protection is a
common alternative argument in expropriation cases.64
TEX-IOTA creates neither "suspect" or "quasi-suspect" clas-
sifications6 nor encroaches on fundamental rights66 and traditional
60. See Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 92-93 (1940) (overruling Colgate v. Harvey,
296 U.S. 404 (1935)). See also Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U.S. 491 (1879) (citizens are not
entitled to relief from enforcement of state laws prescribing the mode and subject of taxa-
tion if tax does not violate federal statutory or constitutional law). Thus, there could be no
colorable claim that taking interest on litigation advances in trust accounts somehow frus-
trated a privilege of access to the courts. But see Appellant's Brief at 37, Webb's Fabulous
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980). Furthermore, corporate clients may not
claim the protection of the clause. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936).
61. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
62. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 395 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring). The Texas
constitutional equivalent of "equal protection" speaks in terms of "equal rights." See Tax.
CONST. art. I, § 3. Cases construing the section draw substantively upon federal constitu-
tional standards. See, e.g., Rucker v. State, 342 S.W.2d 325, 326-27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1961).
63. Dunham, supra note 56, at 69-70. See generally 2 J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMI-
NENr DOMAIN § 5.1[4], at 5-24 to 5-28 (3d ed. 1981).
64. See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 102 S. Ct. 781, 797 (1982); Fountain v. Metropoli-
tan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 678 F.2d 1038, 1045 n.13 (11th Cir. 1982); Kinzli v. City of
Santa Cruz, 539 F. Supp. 887, 894 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Rowe v. Fauver, 533 F. Supp. 1239, 1247
(D.N.J. 1982).
65. No stretch of the imagination can subject TEX-IOTA to the strictest level of scru-
tiny reserved for suspect classifications, which has been described as "strict in theory and
fatal in fact." Gunther, Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAiv. L. Rav. 1, 8 (1972).
In the absence of some improper application of TEX-IOTA, we cannot foresee a dis-
crimination which would trigger an intermediate scrutiny. See generally Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 210 n.* (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (applying intermediate scrutiny to gender
classifications); Gunther, supra (discussing the development of equal protection analysis).
At most, viewed out of focus, TEX-IOTA may be a reverse wealth discrimination in which
those with more wealth, or at least wealth in a particular form, must pay a bounty. Presum-
ably, such a reverse discrimination would be evaluated at the same level as the correspond-
ing positive discrimination. Cf. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (applying the
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equal protection analysis would apply the "rational basis" test.6 7
Under this "relatively relaxed" or "minimal scrutiny" standard,
TEX-IOTA would be upheld if it "classif[ies] the persons it affects
in a manner rationally related to legitimate governmental objec-
tives."' 8 The legitimate governmental objectives of TEX-IOTA are:
(1) to provide legal services to the poor; (2) to provide funds for
the client security fund; and (3) to improve grievance procedures.69
The purposes plainly are constitutional, even laudable, but propo-
nents mistakenly have concluded that this is enough.
The real equal protection issue is whether the means chosen
are rationally related to these legitimate purposes. TEX-IOTA
would not affect all litigants or even all litigants who have hired an
attorney. Rather, a certain class of client is singled out: those who
pay advances to their attorney. The key inquiry is whether this
narrow discrimination is a rational means to achieve the state's
purpose. The existence of other measures, better suited to the spe-
rational basis test to attack "minority business enterprise" as reverse wealth discrimina-
tion). Thus, "rationality" would be the rule. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
66. See W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 535-53 (1980).
See generally Hernandez v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 558 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (states encroaching on "fundamental rights" are sub-
jected to "strict scrutiny"). Arguably, TEX-IOTA would implicate the fundamental right of
access to the courts. Brief of Appellants at 37, Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beck-
with, 449 U.S. 155 (1980). A line of cases describes such access in criminal matters to be
fundamental. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 343
(1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). A surcharge on a litigant's pecuniary advances
has only a potential chilling effect unlike a burden on access which leaves some frozen out of
court. Furthermore, these precedents do not translate well to civil proceedings. Compare
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (recognizing indigent's right of access to the
courts in a divorce action) with Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (refusing to recog-
nize a right of access to the courts in order to challenge a reduction in welfare benefits) and
United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (refusing to recognize a right of access in a bank-
ruptcy proceeding).
67. E.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980); Harrah In-
dep. School Dist. v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194 (1979).
68. Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230-34 (1981). See also Zobel v. Williams, 102
S. Ct. 2309 (1982) (applying the rational test to hold the retrospective aspect of Alaska's
dividend distribution program violative of equal protection); G.D. Searle & Co. v. Cohn, 102
S. Ct. 1137 (1982) (applying the rational test to review state's corporation law); Texaco, Inc.
v. Short, 102 S. Ct. 781 (1982) (recognizing the state's power to legislate in the area of
mineral interests and upholding such legislation in the absence of arbitrary action). For an
extended discussion of the rationality review, see generally Leedes, The Rationality Re-
quirement of the Equal Protection Clause, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 639 (1981).
69. See supra text accompanying note 36.
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cific goals, does not void the proposal so long as TEX-IOTA is a
reasonable means. Even when viewed as a narrow discrimination,
TEX-IOTA may satisfy equal protection because the Constitution
is concerned only if the measure is rational-not how rational.70
3. Due Process
The Janus-faced due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment encompasses two distinct and general limitations on govern-
ment power: the somewhat redundantly named procedural due
process and the somewhat paradoxically named substantive due
process. Since it is well settled that a state may not take private
property without affording the owner both due process guarantees,
each would apply to TEX-IOTA. 71 Of the two, procedural due pro-
cess is less of a limitation because the narrow "judicial evaluation
focuses on the decision-making process wholly apart from the fair-
ness of the underlying rule being applied." '72 Assuming arguendo
that TEX-IOTA would cause a deprivation of property, the issue
becomes whether the procedure afforded is adequate.
While the procedural minima of notice and an opportunity to
be heard must be meaningful, the specific dictates of procedural
due process are determined by a juggling of three factors: (1) "the
private interest that will be affected by the official action"; (2) "the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the pro-
cedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or sub-
stitute procedural safeguards"; and (3) "the Government's interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
70. See In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1981). After all, the
most scintillating recent debate under this standard has concerned just how "toothless" the
equal protection review is in such cases. See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449
U.S. 166 (1980).
71. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-80 (1971) (substantive due process);
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950) (procedural due
process). The Texas Constitution requires "due course of the law of the land." TEx. CONST.
art. I, § 19. Courts have consistently held that this language brings to bear the same restric-
tions on the power of the state encompassed by the term "due process." See, e.g., Mellinger
v. City of Houston, 68 Tex. 37, 44, 3 S.W. 249, 252 (1887); Ex parte Young, 418 S.W.2d 824,
826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967); Masonic Grand Chapter of Order of E. Star v. Sweatt, 329
S.W.2d 334, 337 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.); State ex rel. Pan Am.
Prod. Co. v. Texas City, 295 S.W.2d 697, 704 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1956), aff'd, 303
S.W.2d 780 (Tex. 1957).
72. Baker, Constitutional Law, Fifth Circuit Symposium, 27 Loy. L. REv. 805, 832
(1981).
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burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail. ' 73 Although it is frequently invoked in expropriation
litigation,74 procedural due process is not much of a facial chal-
lenge to a statute like TEX-IOTA. 7' The legislative process, in-
cluding public hearings on the proposed bill, satisfies the
requirement.
The critical inquiry narrows to an evaluation of the procedures
TEX-IOTA provides affected individuals. Elaborate procedures
may be ensconced with a flourish and meticulously observed 7 or
may be magically waived so long as the magic is constitutional. Of
course, the client may waive constitutional rights, including any
procedural protections. 7 The problem posed for TEX-IOTA is
that the owner/client must waive the entitled due process know-
ingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. 78 The initial 1978 Florida pro-
posal required that an attorney obtain the client's consent before
deposit of the funds.79 This would have assumed the necessary
constitutional waiver from the failure of the client to object to a
somewhat vague and incomplete mailed notice. This scheme raised
a "serious constitutional question" even for some proponents of
73. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
74. See generally 1 J. SACKMAN, supra note 63, §§ 4.1-4.14, at 4-1 to 4-232 (discussing
constitutional rights and limitations).
75. See Hulen, Abusive Exercises of the Power of Eminent Domain-Taking a Look
at What the Taker Took, 44 WASH. L. REv. 200, 212 (1968).
76. Procedural due process shares with its fourteenth amendment twin the fundamen-
tal policy of protecting against arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable governmental action.
Depending on what is at stake in the context between government and individual, the Ma-
thews factors, supra text accompanying note 73, may require such procedures as follow in
rough order of importance: (1) "an unbiased tribunal"; (2) "notice of the proposed action
and the grounds asserted for it"; (3) "an opportunity to present reasons why the proposed
action should not be taken"; (4), (5), and (6) "the rights to call witnesses, to know the
evidence against one, and to have decision based only on the evidence presented"; (7)
"counsel"; (8) and (9) "the making of a record and a statement of reasons"; (10) "public
attendance"; and (11) "judicial review." Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 1267, 1279-95 (1975). Although in the rare situation procedures must be provided
before governmental action, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), a party is not entitled to
a comprehensive pretaking hearing if there are adequate post hoc judicial remedies. Foun-
tain v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 678 F.2d 1038, 1045 n.13 (1lth Cir. 1982)
(citing Cherokee Nat'l v. Southern Kan. Ry., 135 U.S. 641, 649-50 (1890); Stringer v. United
States, 471 F.2d 381, 383 (5th Cir. 1973)).
77. See D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185-87 (1972).
78. Id. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
79. See In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 356 So. 2d 799, 811 (Fla. 1978).
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TEX-IOTA.80 The present Florida programs' and TEX-IOTA82 go
further and completely eliminate client participation in the invest-
ment decision. This may amount to the attorney pulling the rabbit
out of the client's hat without the client saying the magic constitu-
tional words. The procedural due process issue has not been af-
forded adequate attention. As Judge Aldisert so succinctly put the
issue: "The question presented in any of these cases is straightfor-
ward and unsophisticated: how seriously is the complainant being
hurt and how much will it cost to afford him or her a more effec-
tive procedure?18 3  An argument based on the shibboleth de
minimis non curat lex might be wide of the mark. 4 Justice Stew-
art seemed to suggest as much in Fuentes v. Shevin:5
The Fourteenth Amendment speaks of "property" generally. And,
under our free-enterprise system, an individual's choices in the
marketplace are respected, however unwise they may seem to
someone else. It is not the business of a court adjudicating due
process rights to make its own critical evaluation of those choices
and protect only the ones that, by its own lights, are
"inecessary."86
There is no question, however, that the degree of injury plays a
critical role in determining what process is due. 7 The issue must
80. See Comment, supra note 16, at 539, 557-59; Comment, A Source of Revenue for
the Improvement of Legal Services, Part II: A Recommendation for the Use of Clients'
Funds Held by Attorneys in Non-Interest-Bearing Trust Accounts to Support Programs of
the Texas Bar Association and an Analysis of the Federal Income Tax Ramifications, 11
ST. MARY'S L.J. 113, 129-31 (1979).
81. See In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389, 395, 398 (Fla. 1981). Justice
Boyd objected that the elimination of notice would create a potential for a conflict of inter-
est and result in a harm to the reputation of the profession. Id. at 399 (Boyd, J., dissenting).
82. See supra text accompanying notes 34-37; infra Appendix A. A form waiver on a
receipt given the client who pays advances might suffice. See D.H. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick
Co., 405 U.S. 174, 186 (1972). Such a routine might jeopardize TEX-IOTA's favorable tax
treatment. See supra note 22. Lack of client control over the creation or destiny of earnings
produced by attorney-held funds is the keystone of the tax treatment which makes the
IOTA programs work. If the client has no control over the placement of funds in interest-
bearing accounts and no participation in the decision-making in that regard, then the in-
come produced is not attributable to the client. See In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 402
So. 2d 389, 390, 391 (Fla. 1981); Rev. Rul. 81-209, 1981-2 C.B. 16, 17. Resolution of the tax
problem contributes to the constitutional questions.
83. Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 84 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc) (Aldisert, J., dissent-
ing), sur motion for vacation of judgment, 658 F.2d 93 (1981).
84. See Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp. 519 F. Supp. 1252 (D.N.J. 1981).
85. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
86. Id. at 90.
87. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). See also supra text accompa-
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be addressed within that framework. In Texas the issue has been
overlooked in large part.
The substantive face of fourteenth amendment due process is
nothing more than equal protection rational analysis sans classifi-
cation." Substantive due process is characterized by such near
complete judicial deference that statutes are upheld for "virtually
no substantive reason at all. . . except where constitutional provi-
sions much more explicit. . . [are] in jeopardy." 9 Despite the rec-
ognition that substantive due process analysis is colored by the
context of government action90 and may be more vibrant in situa-
tions which resemble takings,91 the test still is reasonableness con-
sidering what is taken, why, and how.9 2 If TEX-IOTA is reasonable
enough to meet the equal protection standard, substantive due
process is satisfied. Nevertheless, the issue should be faced
squarely and disposed of with an appropriate explanation. 3
C. The Taking Clause
Wholly apart from the procedural and substantive aspects
which stand on their own bottom, the due process clause has a
third meaning, which in the present context eclipses the other two.
Historically, the fifth amendment provision that private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation was a
tacit recognition of the preexisting taking power" but initially lim-
ited only the federal government." Rather than depending on nat-
hying note 73.
88. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Railway Ex-
press Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 111 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring); Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934).
89. L. TRIBE, supra note 45, § 8-7, at 450-51 (citing Ferguson v. Skrupa, 373 U.S. 726
(1963)).
90. See Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1 (1929); Mumme v. Marrs, 120 Tex. 383, 40
S.W.2d 31 (1931).
91. Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 165, 212
n.122 (1974); Hulen, supra note 75, at 220-32; Michelman, supra note 57, at 1182, 1195.
92. 1 J. SACKMAN, supra note 63, § 4.4[11], at 4-14 to 4-15.
93. See In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 356 So. 2d 799, 805-07 (Fla. 1978).
94. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
95. United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 241-42 (1946). The corresponding provi-
sion in the Texas Constitution provides: "No person's property shall be taken, damaged or
destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate compensation being made, unless by
the consent of such person ...... Tax. Co~s'r. art. I, § 19.
96. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833).
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ural law to give content to the fourteenth amendment in takings,9 7
the Supreme Court incorporated the fifth amendment's just com-
pensation and public use limitations." Two analytical points de-
serve emphasis. First, the fifth amendment taking clause incorpo-
rated in the fourteenth amendment due process clause has a
vitality separate and distinct from procedural and substantive due
process standing alone."s Having described the latter two does not
preempt discussion of the former. Second, a comprehensive under-
standing of the fifth amendment incorporated into the fourteenth
amendment taking analysis convinces us that much of equal pro-
tection and procedural and substantive due process shines through.
It is almost as if the incorporated clause reincorporates the incor-
porating amendment.'00 Put another way, the incorporated fifth
97. See Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42
HAv. L. REV. 144 (1928); Grant, The "Higher Law" Background of the Law of Eminent
Domain, 6 Wis. L. REV. 67 (1931); Grant, The Natural Law Background of Due Process, 31
COLUM. L. REV. 56 (1931); Haines, The Law of Nature in State and Federal Judicial Deci-
sions, 25 YALE L.J. 617 (1916); Kratovil & Harrison, supra note 56; Lenhoff, Development of
the Concept of Eminent Domain, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 596 (1942). The taking clause has strict
historical antecedents in the writings of such seventeenth and eighteenth century jurispru-
dents as Grotius, Pufendorf, Bynkershoek, Burlamaqui, and Vattel. See Sax, Takings and
the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 54-57 (1964); Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent
Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553, 559-69 (1972). For a historical discussion of taking law in
common-law England and in the colonies, see generally id. Texas courts also recognize a
natural law source for property rights. See, e.g., Spann v. City of Dallas, 111 Tex. 350, 356,
235 S.W. 513, 515 (1921).
98. See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898) (employment restrictions); Chicago, B.
& 0. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (just compensation); Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Ne-
braska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896) (public use). Later holdings enshrined these declarations. See
Buzzo v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393 (1922). Any doubt about incorporation was put to rest in Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies,
Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980). See also Fountain v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid
Transit Auth., 678 F.2d 1038 (11th Cir. 1982) (inverse condemnation); Hernandez v. City of
Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1981) (just compensation). For a thorough treatment of
incorporation, see generally 1 L. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN
169 (2d ed. 1953); Sax, supra note 97; Scheiber, The Road to Munn: Eminent Domain and
the Concept of Public Purpose in the State Courts, 5 PERSPECTivEs IN AMERICAN HISTORY
329 (1971); Stoebuck, supra note 97.
99. See Fitzgerald v. Estelle, 505 F.2d 1334 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 422
U.S. 1011 (1975) (distinguishing between due process generally and specifically incorporated
right).
100. We find some support for the novel proposition that incorporated taking analysis
reincorporates due process and equal protection a la the phenomenon in Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497 (1954), in the following sources, at least by analogy: Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 102 S. Ct. 3164, 3179 (1982); Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 102 S. Ct. 781
passim (1982); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981);
Modesett v. Emmons, 292 S.W. 855 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927, holding approved); E. BAR-
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amendment takes its analysis from equal protection and due pro-
cess principles. Keeping in mind that the taking analysis thus par-
adoxically is both independent and dependent of what has been
previously analyzed, we turn to the most difficult constitutional
challenge for TEX-IOTA.
As in other areas, the fourteenth amendment establishes a
constitutional minimum.10 1 Because under our scheme of govern-
ment it is "the province and duty of the judicial department, to
say what the law is,"102 we must consider the judicial interpreta-
tions of the due process incorporation of the prohibition that "pri-
vate property [not] be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion."10 3 As is perhaps true of constitutional law generally, the
modern era of constitutional taking jurisprudence e4 has been char-
acterized as more philosophy than doctrine. 05 Our purpose here is
not to philosophize, but rather to emphasize doctrine and the con-
stitutional framework within which TEX-IOTA must be analyzed.
We are not concerned with the wisdom or efficiency of TEX-IOTA
and have no quarrel with TEX-IOTA's goals or their importance.
TEX-IOTA may be Pareto-optimal and improve the situaton of its
beneficiaries without damaging further the situation of anyone
else, 06 but that is not the constitutional approach to evaluation,
and it will not be ours.'0 7
RETr & W. COHEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 565 (1981); Berger, supra note 91, at 167; Dunham,
supra note 56, at 70-71; Hulen, supra note 75, at 220; Lavine, supra note 56, at 377;
Michelman, Property as Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1097, 1098 (1981);
Olson, The Role of "Fairness" in Establishing a Constitutional Theory of Taking, 3 URB.
LAW. 440 (1971).
101. 1 L. ORGEL, supra note 98, at 33. See also J. NOWAK, supra note 58, at 446
(describing factors which determine compensation constitutionally due).
102. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (reaffirmed in United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974)). See supra note 56.
103. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See supra text accompanying notes 96-101.
104. Justice Harlan's seminal opinion in Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), marks
the beginning of the modern era of Supreme Court adjudication. Sax, Takings, Private
Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 149 n.3 (1971). For an account of taking from
the separation of powers/judicial review viewpoint, see generally Hulen, supra note 75.
105. One author has suggested that when dealing with property law and constitutional
theory, "[a]nalysts must become philosophers if they wish to remain lawyers." B. AcKxa-
MAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 5 (1977). Many of the sources cited else-
where in this article struggle With the philosophy of taking law. One of the best received has
been Michelman, supra note 57.
106. Michelman, supra note 57, at 1176.
107. Our narrow concern is the change from the present system to TEX-IOTA. We do
not consider whether the present system of bar-sanctioned trust deposits works a taking by
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1. Taking and Taxing
Obviously, there is a great deal of artificiality in attempting to
classify modern exercises. of the sovereign power into Year Book
pigeonholes. Some exercises do not fit into any holes, some fit into
several, and there is nothing to put in some holes. Nevertheless, to
understand the phenomenon of taking, some sense of context, and
within context some line drawing, is necessary if only to identify
the analysis to follow. Thus, to better understand what a taking is,
it is useful to describe what a taking is not. A taking is neither a
tax nor a police power regulation. The "how" and "why," or more
accurately the "how not" and "why not," provide necessary back-
ground."' 8 The taxing, police, and taking powers have one thing in
common: together they are the sine qua non for the government
function to protect the health, safety, and general welfare of the
public.109
Taxing and taking are much the same power with one impor-
tant difference. The difference is not the distinction between ex-
acting money and exacting property because money is property. 110
Then how does one avoid the impasse that characterizing taxation
as a taking would require compensation exactly equal to the tax?
The answer is found not in the difference between money and
things but in the nature of a tax. Taxing is the power to "raise
the banks who have free use (interest) of clients' money. In any event, it cannot be argued
seriously that a constitutional remedy for any taking by the banks will be afforded by a
taking by the bar foundation. Just compensation is the constitutional remedy for a taking,
not substituting another taker. But cf. Memorandum to Committee on Client Protection
from Robert L. Byrd (May 19, 1982) (suggesting that TEX-IOTA is a remedy for the pre-
sent "taking") [hereinafter cited as Robert L. Byrd Memorandum]. "Requiring compensa-
tion when a conflict among competing users . . . is resolved against them, inevitably skews
the political resolution of conflicts over resource use and discriminates against public
rights." Sax, supra note 104, at 160.
108. We recognize that the correlative approach to defining takings as what is neither
a tax nor a regulation has been criticized. See Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Ac-
commodation Power: Antidotes for the Taking Impasse in Land Controversies, 75 COLUM.
L. Rev. 1021 (1975). Nevertheless, the Court still operates in the main along the lines we
have selected.
109. For a discussion of the triumvirate of sovereignty and their role in taking, see
generally A. JAHR, LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1953); I. LEvey, CONDEMNATION IN U.S.A.
(1969); J. LEWIS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN (3d ed. 1909); H. MILLS & A. ABBOTT, MILLS
ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN (2d ed. 1888).
110. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980); Sniadach v.
Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969). But see Friedman v. American Surety Co., 137
Tex. 149, 160, 151 S.W.2d 570, 577 (1941).
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funds for public expenses by exacting a contribution, based upon a
uniform rule of apportionment, either upon the residents or upon
the property in a locality."'11 In contrast, a taking exacts more
than the property owner's proportionate share of the public bur-
den.112 The difference is between even and uneven exaction.11 3
When an individual is forced to contribute more than his propor-
tionate share the government becomes a debtor for the property
taken; for taxes, no compensation is owed beyond the protection
and benefits generally provided by government. "
If TEX-IOTA is a tax it would not be subject to the taking
restrictions and no compensation would be owed. The "tax" could
be an exaction on the successful litigant who has been paid a
money judgment; however, the realities dispute this characteriza-
tion. Unlike other state plans, TEX-IOTA would exempt these
funds."' Typically, an unsuccessful defendant's insurance com-
pany issues a draft to plaintiff and plaintiff's attorney. Plaintiff's
attorney's bank now often provides a cash advance while the draft
is processed. If the bank would have to pay interest on the attor-
ney's trust account, this practice of advances likely would be dis-
rupted and successful plaintiffs would be paid later. Such pay-
ments under TEX-IOTA would be exempted chiefly to protect the
relationship between the attorney and the bank. If TEX-IOTA is a
tax, it taxes what is nonexempt: fee advances, cost advances, and
other escrow deposits. Viewed realistically, it is a tax on legal assis-
tance, whether a client is sued, suing, or seeking to avoid suit. Per-
haps the bar leadership can justify such a "justice tax" imposed on
a small class,"" but so far it has not tried. Serious policy issues,
not to mention public relations problems, are involved in the tax-
ing approach." 7 Whatever the justification ultimately put forward,
it is clear that merely mislabeling the measure as a tax will not
111. Sackman, The Right to Condemn, 29 ALB. L. REv. 177, 177 (1965).
112. Id. at 178; Sax, supra note 97, at 75-76.
113. Stoebuck, supra note 97, at 571-72.
114. Sackman, supra note 111, at 178. See Pan Am. Prod. Co. v. Texas City, 157 Tex.
450, 454, 303 S.W.2d 780, 783 (1957). For a discussion of federal constitutional restraints on
a state's power to tax, see generally J. NOWAK, supra note 58, at 282-374.
115. See infra Appendix A.
116. See supra text acompanying notes 69-70.
117. The equal protection concern for "access to the courts" is one problem. See supra
note 66.
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turn a disproportionate taking into a proportionate tax."18
2. Taking and Regulation
The distinction between a police power regulation and a tak-
ing is even more vague and undefined.1 9 It is well settled that
compensation is required for a governmental taking of property
and not for losses that result from regulation. The generality of the
theory, however, frustrates any attempt at reconciling the decided
cases. Commentators have eschewed the "welter of confusing and
apparently incompatible results' 2 0 in the "crazy-quilt pattern of
Supreme Court doctrine. 12 1 The Court itself has confessed its fail-
ing by admitting that "no rigid rules"'22 or "set formula"' 23 have
been developed.1 24 Circular definitions highlight the confusion. It is
not enough to say, however emphatically, that "[t]he primary dis-
tinguishing characteristic between eminent domain and the police
power is that the former involves the taking of property because it
is needed for public use, while the latter involves the regulation of
118. The Constitution forbids such a mastery:
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, "it means
just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less." "The question is," said
Alice, "whether you can make words mean different things." "The question is,"
said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master-that's all."
L. CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS (1977) (quoted in United States v. Kindrick, 576
F.2d 675, 677 n.2 (5th Cir. 1978)). See supra text accompanying note 113.
119. Commentators have tried mightily to distinguish the two. See E. FREUND, THE
POLICE POWER-PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS §§ 504-60, at 540-86 (1904); A.
JAHR, supra note 109, at 6-8; .LEvEY, supra note 109, §§ 5-5.01, at 46-51; R. ROETTINGER,
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE POLICE POWER (1957); 1 J. SACKMAN, supra note 63, § 1.42[21,
at 1-158 to 1-195; Mercer, Regulation (Police Power) v. Taking (Eminent Domain), 6 N.C.
CENT. L.J. 177 (1975). One eminent commentator has characterized the distinguishment
task as "the most haunting jurisprudential problem in the field of contemporary land use
law." C. HARR, LAND-USE PLANNING 766 (3d ed. 1977).
120. Sax, supra note 97, at 37.
121. Dunham, supra note 56, at 63.
122. United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 156 (1952).
123. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
124. More recent Supreme Court opinions have persisted. E.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444
U.S. 51, 65 (1979) ("it calls as much for the exercise of judgment as for the application of
logic"); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) ("ad hoc, factual
inquiries"); United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958) ("question
properly turning upon the particular circumstances of each case"); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922) ("cannot be disposed of by general propositions"). Perhaps
one explanation for the incongruities in case law is that taking issues have never constituted
a large portion of a Term's docket or the Court's work. Hence, competing lines of analysis
have been parallel and intermittent. See Dunham, supra note 56, at 64.
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property in promoting public health, morals, safety or general wel-
fare.' 2 5 Some courts and commentators have suggested a distinc-
tion between impairment and appropriation; a police power regula-
tion restricts the right of an individual to use or enjoy property in
a way injurious to the public, while a taking transfers the property
to the goverriment to be used beneficially for the public. 26 It is a
distinction without a difference to classify between averting public
detriment and promoting public advantage and the decided cases
hold as much. 27 All the taking/regulation dichotomy decides is
when the government may "invoke the petty larceny of the police
power"'2 8 and avoid compensation. Furthermore, the two catego-
ries are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, a governmental act
couched in the form of a regulation may be better viewed as a tak-
ing instead of, or even in addition to, an exercise of the police
power.2 9
Under some of the traditional tests TEX-IOTA may look more
like a regulation than a taking. If the resemblance is close enough
we may have a petty larceny and no compensation would be owed.
So far, no one has come up with a rationale for TEX-IOTA under
the police power regulation.3 " Under the applicable substantive
125. Sackman, supra note 111, at 178. See I. LEvEY, supra note 109, § 501, at 46-51.
126. E. FsEUm, supra note 119, § 511, at 546-47; 1 J. SACKMAN, supra note 63, §
1.42[21, at 1-158; Sackman, supra note 111, at 179; Stoebuck, supra note 97, at 570.
127. Kratovil & Harrison, supra note 56, at 608. Case analysis also refutes any argued
distinction between a taking, adding benefit to the public, and a police power regulation
preventing harm to some established public interest. Id.
128. The Holmesian aphorism is from a draft opinion in Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co.,
260 U.S. 22 (1922). Justice Holmes deleted the phrase in the final opinion and explained
"[m~y brethren, as usual and as I expected, corrected my taste." 1 HOLMEs-LAsKI LErEss
457 (M. Howe ed. 1953), quoted in G. GuNTHER, CONSTrUTIONAL LAW 545 n.2 (10th ed.
1980). See also Tyson & Bros. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 445-46 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing). The deletion has become more famous than the case. See P. FREuND, A SUTHERLAND,
M. HOWE & E. BROWN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1095 (4th ed. 1977); G. GUNTHER, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 545 n.2 (10th ed. 1980). The earlier theory, whose chief architect was Justice
Harlan, relied on traditional legal concepts of property law and torts to create a difference
in kind. Holmes approached the issue pragmatically on a case-by-case basis. Both theories
have flaws. Harlan's theory is formalistic. Holmes' theory is historically questionable and
has never been followed consistently, even when he was on the Court. See Sax, supra note
97, at 37-38. For a discussion of the two approaches and the Holmes watershed in Pennsyl-
vania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), see generally F. BossELMAN, D. CALLMS & J.
BANTA, THE TAKING IssUE 105-40 (1973).
129. Stoebuck, supra note 97, at 571. See also Steele v. City of Houston, 603 S.W.2d
786 (Tex. 1980) (destruction of private property to apprehend escaped convicts).
130. See In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389, 395-96 (Fla. 1981). But cf.
Robert L. Byrd Memorandum, supra note 107 (exhorting' Texas to do so without specifying
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due process restraint on the police power, TEX-IOTA must be a
rational means to achieve a legitimate police power purpose.13
Proponents conveniently have emphasized the easy half of the
analysis. Again, although the legitimacy of the supposed regulatory
purposes is beyond peradventure,5 2 the critical constitutional
question revolves around the rationality of TEX-IOTA as a regula-
tory means to further these purposes. It is not enough to say that
the goals are substantial and important. The constitutionality of
the means is not established by the constitutionality of the pur-
poses. Perhaps, with a little imagination TEX-IOTA might fit into
the regulatory pigeonhole if the basic premise that it is not a tak-
ing can withstand consitutional scrutiny.
3. Taking Isolated
The most difficult constitutional question TEX-IOTA raises is
whether the fifth/fourteenth amendment taking limits are applica-
ble. If the scheme passes general constitutional restrictions and is
neither a tax nor a police power regulation, taking is all that is
left.133 The "universally accepted definition" of taking is "the
power of the sovereign to take property for public use without the
owner's consent upon making just compensation.' ' 3 4 We will break
this definition down into its component parts by considering the
what should be). No police power justification was offered in Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies,
Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 163 (1980).
131. See supra text accompanying notes 88-94.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 69-70.
133. Our analysis of the taking issue includes some reliance on a leading recent case,
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980), which we will weave
throughout the taking analysis. Under the authority of a Florida statute, a county kept the
interest accrued on interpleader funds deposited in the registry of the county court in addi-
tion to a fee based on the amount of the principal. The deposited money was concededly
private and deposit was required by statute. The Court concluded that earnings of the funds
were incidents of property ownership of the funds. Id. at 159. The unanimous Court deter-
mined that neither the state legislature by statute nor the state courts by judicial decree
could accomplish what was a taking by simply recharacterizing the deposited fund as "pub-
lic money" because it was held temporarily by the court. Id. at 164. Beckwith obviously is a
key precedent in the debate over TEX-IOTA. See Robert L. Byrd Memorandum, supra
note 107 (designed to distinguish Beckwith and TEX-IOTA). Exactly because it has re-
ceived important attention, we choose to widen the scope of debate in the remaining
discussion.
134. Sackman, supra note 111, at 177. The Texas Constitution explicitly incorporates
each of these elements. See Tzx. CONST. art. 1, § 17.
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taker, the taken, and the takee.'3 5
One characteristic which distinguishes a taking from some
other forms of property transfer is that taking occurs between the
government and the individual. The states possess an inherent sov-
ereign power to take private property without the owner's con-
sent.136 Because the power is that of the state acting as sovereign, a
taking occurs only if "the body politic is involved and chooses to
exercise its power. 13 7 Thus, because a state actor is the taker,
state action is evident.3 8
There is, however, one remaining state action problem. It
might be argued that the taking under TEX-IOTA is performed by
a private actor, the attorney, in behalf of a private actor, the desig-
nated private foundation. Despite some confusing signals from the
Supreme Court,139 we do not think this delegation argument
amounts to much. First, a challenge of the TEX-IOTA enabling
statute would be rife with state action.14 0 Second, delegation has
always been a major part of taking jurisprudence and a delegation
does not undo constitutional restraints on government taking. 141 It
cannot be seriously controverted that the constitutional taker
under TEX-IOTA is the state and its delegate.'4 2
135. There are innumerable public policies which could be considered with the taking
issue. See Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1943). Our approach
primarily is doctrinal and constitutional.
136. Dunham, supra note 56, at 71; Hulen, supra note 75, at 200; Lavine, supra note
56, at 369. Other constitutional provisions, such as due process, impose some limits on state
sovereignty. For example, a state has power to take only within its own territory. See Pol-
lard v. Hagen, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845). Presumably, constitutional limits would exist on
TEX-IOTA concerning out-of-state attorneys representing out-of-state clients. See World-
wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S 186
(1977). The point was raised but went unresolved in the proceedings of the Florida Supreme
Court. See In re Interest on Trust Accounts, 402 So. 2d 389, 392 (Fla. 1981).
137. Stoebuck, supra note 97, at 558. See generally A. JAHR, supra note 109, at 26-27
(every state possesses power of eminent domain within its boundaries).
138. See supra text accompanying notes 42-55.
139. Compare Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 102 S. Ct. 2745 (1982) (corporate creditor
and president found to have acted under state action in depriving debtor of property) with
Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (warehouseman's proposed sale of goods en-
trusted to him by statute found not to be state action).
140. See supra text accompanying notes 42-55.
141. Hulen, supra note 75, at 200-01; Lavine, supra note 56, at 371. See also A. JAHR,
supra note 109, at 27-31; 1 J. SACKMAN, supra note 63, §§ 3.22-3.24, at 3-103 to 3-250.
142. There is another delegation doctrine which might have some application. As we
have suggested, the attorney is the state delegate in collecting trust account income. We
have suggested that the distinction between those who are forced to contribute and others
poses problems for equal protection and due process analysis. See supra text accompanying
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The next step in the analysis involves determining what the
taker took. 43 Although a taking involves a forced transfer of
"property," "[t]he concept of property never has been, is not, and
never can be of definite content.""' Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court has developed a modern constitutional analysis of the prop-
erty concept as used in the fifth and fourteenth amendments. For a
time, the Court gave a rather crabbed meaning to "property" in
taking analysis."4 5 Intervening decisions have given "property" a
very broad reading in the fourteenth amendment area of procedu-
ral due process.14 A few years ago, Professor Tribe opined that
"[tihere seems no good reason why the broader definition should
not be extended to the takings context.""1, 7 We submit first, that
there are good reasons to do so and second, that the Court has
done so.
"Property" is "a thoroughly nonspecific term, one for which
the judges have to 'supply content.' "1148 It would be a strange con-
stitution indeed in which the same word in the same amendment
was not given the same meaning when applied in two similar situa-
tions. This is especially true of "property" in the taking context
notes 70 & 89-93. The attorney ordinarily would decide which clients would contribute by
deciding which would be required to prepay. This may be such unfettered discretion that
the statute might violate what is left of the old federal delegation doctrine. See A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Jaffe, An Essay on Delega-
tion of Legislative Power: II, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 561, 578 (1947). Texas has its own version
of the delegation doctrine. See Moody v. City of Univ. Park, 278 S.W.2d 912 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
143. The epigram is from Hulen, supra note 75, at 200.
144. Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property Law, 86 U. PA. L. REv. 691, 696
(1938). See W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPnONS 28 (W. Cook ed. 1919); Cohen,
Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. REV. 8, 11 (1927). The concept of "property" in
taking analysis necessarily is bound-up with the concept of "taking." To suggest that prop-
erty "means every species of interest in land and things of a kind that an owner might
transfer to another private person," truly is to say that "[piroperty, like beauty, exists in the
eye of the beholder." Stoebuck, supra note 97, at 600, 606. We view property in the larger,
constitutional scheme of things. Within the constitutional realm, finespun distinctions about
property found in the Restatement scheme largely are ignored. Compare Michelman, supra
note 57, at 1185-86 n.41 (distinguishing meanings of property) with Buchanan v. Warley,
245 U.S. 60 (1917) (property includes things owned and rights in it).
145. See, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 608-11 (1960) (social security expec-
tations not property subject to compensation under taking law); United States v. Petty Mo-
tor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 379-80 (1946) (leasehold renewal expectation not property). See gener-
ally Sackman, supra note 111, at 183-87.
146. See infra note 177.
147. L. TRiBE, supra note 45, § 9-3, at 459 n.11.
148. Michelman, supra note 57, at 1109.
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since that analysis really reincorporates policies from due process
and equal protection. 4 9 What will be constitutionally protected in
each of these three contexts depends on the same anglo-american
tradition of property law and equitable principles of fundamental
fairness. 150 To establish this unified theory of constitutional prop-
erty, we rely in part on the long line of cases which hold that what
constitutes fifth amendment property in a federal condemnation
proceeding must ultimately be determined by state law.15 ' But we
need not rely on analogy exclusively. Mirroring the approach of
prominent commentators,' 52 the Supreme Court has applied the
procedural due process property analysis in recent taking cases.5'5
The property definition developed in procedural due process
decisions and now applied in taking decisions involves what consti-
tutional law buffs like to call a two-tiered test.'" First, "the under-
lying substantive interest is created by 'an independent source
such as state law. . . .' "' Second, "federal constitutional law de-
termines whether that interest rises to the level of a 'legitimate
claim of entitlement' "156 We will consider these tiers
separately.
State law, decisional and statutory, creates and defines the
dimensions of property through "existing rules and understand-
149. See supra text accompanying notes 99-100.
150. J. NowA, supra note 58, at 449.
151. See United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 279
(1943) ("Though the meaning of 'property' as used in... the Fifth Amendment is a federal
question, it will normally obtain its content by reference to local law."). This is described as
the general rule in Annot., 1 A.L.R. FEn. 479, 482-85 (1969).
152. See R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 6-8 (3d ed. 1955); 1 J. SACKMAN,
supra note 63, § 4.5[3], at 4-22; Michelman, supra note 57, at 1099-104; Sackman, supra
note 111, at 185. Litigants view the property concept as sufficiently interchangeable between
due process and taking to apply precedents in the latter category to the former. Brief of
Amicus Curiae passim, Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). Cf. Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders
Corp., 519 F. Supp. 1252, 1260 (D.N.J. 1981) (plaintiff arguing some property rights not
entitled to due process protection).
153. See Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 102 S. Ct. 781, 789-91 (1982); Webb's Fabulous Phar-
macies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980).
154. See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978); Bishop v.
Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972); Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1971). See generally Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and
"Property", 62 CORNELL L. REv. 405, 434-44 (1977) (discussing the development and appli-
cation of the two-tiered test).
155. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978) (quoting Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972)).
156. 436 U.S. at 9.
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ings.' ' 5 7 On this level, TEX-IOTA proponents argue that there is
no property to be owned by the client since trust accounts pres-
ently are maintained without interest. However, one cannot begin
by deciding that a claim is not property because that is really the
question to be answered; 15 8 "under our constitutional system, some
property rights have names and others do not."'-9 TEX-IOTA
would generate interest, which in the form of money surely may be
considered property. The conclusion that no property presently ex-
ists does not answer the question of ownership in the event that
property is created.
TEX-IOTA does not create the right to receive interest in-
come from client trust funds. It merely seeks to allocate it to the
designated foundation. In Texas the right to interest from a fund
is a constitutionally protected private property right of the owner
of the fund. 160 The property nature of the right to income is deeply
rooted in anglo-saxon jurisprudence. At common law the right to
receive income from the land was ownership.'61 This concept was
readily transferable into the personal property realm, leading one
Texas court, in 1920, to say that "[i]nterest, according to all the
authorities, is an accretion to the principal fund earning it, and,
unless lawfully separated therefrom, becomes a part thereof.' 6
Texas courts and legislative enactments have also recognized, in
analogous situations, the property nature of the right to receive in-
terest.163 With reference to trust funds, it is generally accepted
157. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
158. Kratovil & Harrison, supra note 56, at 616.
159. Id. at 612.
160. Sellers v. Harris County, 483 S.W.2d 242, 244 (Tex. 1972). The court quoted ap-
provingly from the Supreme Court of North Carolina: "The earnings on the fund are a mere
incident of ownership of the fund itself. The constitutional provision . . . applies to the
earnings in the same manner, and with the same force, as it applies to the principal." Id. at
243-44 (quoting McMillan v. Robeson County, 262 N.C. 413, -, 137 S.E.2d 105, 108
(1964)). This right, of course, is subject to waiver, as when the owner of funds agrees to
accept a stipulated rate of interest even though the debtor may be (and probably is) earning
a higher rate, and is also subject to regulation, as in usury statutes.
161. United States v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 324 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1963). See also Himely
v. Rose, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 313, 317 (1809) ("In equity, interest goes with the principal as the
fruit with the tree.").
162. Lawson v. Baker, 220 S.W. 260, 272 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1920, writ ref'd).
See, e.g., TEx. AT'Y GEN. Op. Nos. MW-481 (1982), MW-47 (1979), H-1174 (1978), C-610
(1966). See also Annot., 5 A.L.R.2d 257 (1948) (dealing with the liability of a public officer
for interest received on public money in his possession).
163. See, e.g., City of Austin v. Austin Nat'l Bank, 503 S.W.2d 759, 761 (Tex. 1974) (a
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that the beneficiary of a trust has a right to income earned auto-
matically as a matter of law without the necessity of any agree-
ment to spell it out.'" Difficulty in ascertaining or distributing in-
terest should not be a factor in deciding who is entitled to it.' 6
A better argument on this level for proponents would charac-
terize TEX-IOTA as a change in the law which defines the prop-
erty.166 "[Niew social circumstances can justify legislative modifi-
cation of a property owner's common-law rights, without
compensation, if the legislative action serves sufficiently important
public interests." '167 This argument, however, makes little effort to
escape an ends-justify-the-means logic which is not well taken in
constitutional law. Still, the explicit premise of the fourteenth
amendment that individuals can have property not only among
themselves but also vis-a-vis the government has arrayed against it
the implicit premise that individual ownership is always subject to
the risk of redistribution of value by the government.'6 8
The best argument proponents raise involves the common-law
maxim de minimis non curat lex.'69 The notion that the law does
not care for or take notice of very small or trifling matters is part
of the substantive Texas law to be considered on the first constitu-
tional tier.17 0 As a question of substantive common law, the de
devise of income arising from personalty is an absolute gift of the corpus); TEX. PROB. CODE
ANN. § 239 (Vernon 1956) (income to be paid to owners of assets).
164. See Wignall v. Fletcher, 303 N.Y. 435, 103 N.E.2d 728 (1952); Blaustein v. Pan
Am. Petroleum & ITransp. Co., 174 Misc. 601, 21 N.Y.S.2d 651 (1940); Lonsdale v. Speyer,
249 A.D. 133, 291 N.Y.S. 495 (1936).
165. Bordy v. Smith, 150 Neb. 272, -, 34 N.W.2d 331, 334 (1948).
166. This approach comes close to Justice Rehnquist's position that the claimant must
accept all of the state law and "take the bitter with the sweet." Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134, 154 (1974). See also UNIF. EMINENT DOMAIN CODE § 608, 13 U.L.A. 73 (1980) (describing
procedure for determining owner of interest on eminent domain deposits). This approach
has commanded a majority only in its rejection. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 355
(1976) (White, J., dissenting). This rejection does much to undermine the argument in the
text.
167. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 102 S. Ct. 3164, 3186 (1982)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260-61 (1946);
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876)). See Kratovil & Harrison, supra note 56, at 598.
168. Michelman, supra note 57, at 1110.
169. Robert L. Byrd Memorandum, supra note 107 (suggesting that TEX-IOTA is too
insignificant to be a "taking").
170. See, e.g., Fort Worth Neuropsychiatric Hosp., Inc. v. Bee Jay Corp., 587 S.W.2d
746, 757 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 600 S.W.2d 763 (Tex.
1980); Anguiano v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 561 S.W.2d 249, 255 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Love v. Spur Indep. School Dist., 143 S.W.2d 793, 796 (Tex.
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minimis maxim applies to small amounts of money.17 1 By defini-
tion, the sums collectively held in a TEX-IOTA account would be
impractical and uneconomical individual investments. For exam-
ple, $500 held for one week would generate less than sixty cents,
not even enough to pay for accounting and bookkeeping.1 7 Argua-
bly, such trifles are so negligible as not to be cognizable property
under state law.17 3
State law, however, does not control the property issue. The
second tier of property analysis is controlled by federal constitu-
tional law and asks whether the state-created interest rises to the
level of federally protected property. It is immaterial that some cli-
ents conceivably would want their sixty cents interest unless there
is a state rule of property which creates legitimate client expecta-
tions. "[A] mere unilateral expectation or an abstract need is not a
property interest entitled to protection" under the due process and
taking clauses.1 7 4 Just as an individual may not unilaterally claim a
property interest, however, neither may the state unilaterally ig-
nore or extinguish property interests.' 75 The constitutional "hall-
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1940, no writ).
171. E.g., Doe v. Marshall, 622 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1980) ($15.00); Young v. Fidelity
Union Life Ins. Co., 597 F.2d 705 (10th Cir. 1979) ($0.01); Northern v. Nelson, 448 F.2d 1266
(9th Cir. 1971) ($1.05); FDIC v. Freudenfeld, 492 F. Supp. 763 (E.D. Wis. 1980) ($1.00).
Presumably, the same maxim would obtain in Texas. See Anguiano v. Jim Walter Homes,
Inc., 561 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Thornhill v.
Sharpstown Dodge Sales, Inc., 546 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, no writ).
172. Comment, supra note 16, at 539 n.3.
173. See Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980) (involv-
ing interest in excess of $100,000). No state law concept of de minimis was raised, for the
obvious reason.
174. Id. at 161 (citing Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499
(1945); Fox River Paper Co. v. Texas Railroad Comm'n, 274 U.S. 651 (1927)).
175. There is an obvious tension between the two tiers; between a deference to state
law in determining the scope of the interest, on the one hand, and applying an objective
federal measure of the legitimacy of the claimed entitlement. This tension is manifest when
the two inquiries conflict. In such situations, the second tier controls. Recent decisions sug-
gest that the fourteenth amendment is a limit on state sovereign power to create, change,
and transfer property under state law. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 102 S. Ct. 3164, 3178 (1982); Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 102 S. Ct. 781, 798-99 (1982)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164-
65 (1980). One district court already has suggested that the logic of this development
portends the emergence of a constitutionally based property right. See Rowe v. Fauver, 533
F. Supp. 1239, 1243 n.4 (D.N.J. 1982). The artificiality of the two-tiered property analysis
seems to be collapsing like the house of cards that it is. For a provocative argument that
property was, is, and should be defined directly by the Constitution, see generally
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mark of property ... is an individual entitlement grounded in
state law, which cannot be removed except 'for cause.' ",176 Once
this characteristic exists, fourteenth amendment "property" exists.
This characteristic is shared by varied interests, 177 both tangible
and intangible, relating "'to the whole domain of social and eco-
nomic fact,' 1'8 including personal property 179 in the form of
money interest.1 80 Although proponents of TEX-IOTA have not
yet made the distinction, their de minimis argument may have
some legitimacy at the second level of the constitutional analysis.
The argument would suggest that finespun theories of property be-
come gossamer at some point.181 Some commentators have sug-
gested that there is a fourteenth amendment plimsoll line of prop-
erty below which the Constitution has no application.1 82 There is
some Supreme Court, 183 lower federal court, 184 and state supreme
Michelman, supra note 57.
176. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 102 S. Ct. 1148, 1155 (1982). Cf. Wellington,
The Nature of Judicial Review, 92 YALE L.J. 486, 491 (1982) (property interest dependent
upon possessor's reliance upon its security and inviolability).
177. See, e.g., Barry v. Varchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64 (1979) (horse trainer's license); Mem-
phis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1978) (utility service); Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (disability benefits); Gross v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573
(1975) (high school education); Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207, 208 (1971) (govern-
ment employment); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (driver's license); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (welfare benefits).
178. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 102 S. Ct. 1148, 1155 (1982) (quoting National
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting)).
179. I. LEVEY, supra note 109, § 9, at 94-96.
180. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980). See also 1 L.
ORGEL, supra note 98, § 5, at 19-23 (just compensation requires interest on amount repre-
senting value of property taken).
181. For a summary and critique of property theory in taking law, see generally
Michelman, supra note 57, at 1202-13.
182. See Callies & Duerksen, Value Recapture as a Source of Funds to Finance Pub-
lic Projects, 8 Uri. L. ANN. 73, 85 (1974); Dunham, supra note 56, at 80; Kratovil & Harri-
son, supra note 56, at 612; Michelman, supra note 57, at 1109-11; Sackman, supra note 111,
at 188-89; Sax, supra note 97, at 51-52. Cf. 2 J. SACKMAN, supra note 63, § 5.112], at 5-21 to -
22 (every person with an interest in the subject matter of the taking must be compensated).
183. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 102 S. Ct. 3164, 3183 n.6
(1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975); Eisen v. Carlile &
Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 185 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring and dissenting); Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 n.21 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 339, 342 (1969)
(Harlan, J., concurring); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 531 (1927).
184. See Rose v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 679 F.2d 279, 282 (1st Cir. 1982); Planned
Parenthood League v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006, 1014 (5th Cir. 1981); O'Grady v. City of
Montpelier, 573 F.2d 747, 751 (2d Cir. 1978); Nickens v. White, 536 F.2d 802, 803 (8th Cir.
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court 8 ' authority to support the argument that the de minimis
maxim somehow applies to the protections of the fourteenth
amendment, although it would be inaccurate to say that the point
is clearly established and well defined. The argument simply stated
is that the Constitution does not protect trifles. The answer to this
argument is not so simple. It makes sense that finespun theory
should give way to pragmatism at some point before the threshold
of absurdity. There is some authority, however, to answer that the
de minimis concept should have no relevancy to relations between
individual and government, at least so far as procedural due pro-
cess is concerned.188 In fact, the Supreme Court recently held that
the fourteenth amendment applied in a case in which the property
was valued at $23.50.187 Less than six thousand dollars held in an
interest-bearing account for about a month would generate more
interest.""8 At the very least, the de minimis issue should be raised
concerning TEX-IOTA. So far it has not been correctly raised, let
alone resolved.
The next step in the taking analysis is the "take" itself. When
the government goes "on the take" in the constitutional sense, the
transfer of property must amount to a taking and serve a public
purpose. The paradigm fifth/fourteenth amendment taking "occurs
when a government entity formally condemns a landowner's [real]
property and obtains the fee simple pursuant to its sovereign
power of eminent domain."'8 9 The taking rubric, however, covers
1976); Kimbrough v. O'Neil, 523 F.2d 1057, 1060 n.1 (7th Cir. 1975) (Swygert, J., concur-
ring); Muscare v. Quinn, 520 F.2d 1212, 1215 (7th Cir. 1975). Contra In re Gifford, 669 F.2d
468, 473 (7th Cir. 1982); Evans v. City of Chicago, 522 F. Supp. 789, 796 (N.D. Ill. 1980);
Hayes v. City of Wilmington, 451 F. Supp. 696, 704 (D. Del. 1978); Hillman v. Elliot, 436 F.
Supp. 812, 815 (W.D. Va. 1977).
185. See Hilbers v. City of Anchorage, 611 P.2d 31 (Alaska 1980); Kash Enter. v. City
of Los Angeles, 19 Cal. 3d 294, 562 P.2d 1302, 138 Cal. Rptr. 53 (1977); Roundhouse Constr.
Corp. v. Telesco Masons Supplies Co., 168 Conn. 371, 362 A.2d 778 (1975); Barry Properties,
Inc. v. Fick Bros. Roofing Co., 277 Md. 15, 353 A.2d 222 (1976); Robbinsdale Educ. Ass'n v.
Robbinsdale Fed'n of Teachers, Local 872, 307 Minn. 96, 239 N.W.2d 437 (1976) (en banc);
Town of Bethlehem v. Tucker, 119 N.H. 92, 409 A.2d 1334 (1979); Mobile Components, Inc.
v. Layon, 623 P.2d 591 (Okla. 1980); Klimko v. Virginia Employment Comm'n, 216 Va. 750,
222 S.E.2d 559 (1976); State ex. rel. Yanero v. Fox, 256 S.E.2d 751 (W. Va. 1979).
186. See supra text accompanying note 86. See also United States v. Lamb, 294 F.
Supp. 419 (E.D. Tenn. 1968) (de minimis doctrine applies to questions of minimal damage
and transactions between persons, not between a person and a sovereign).
187. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
188. Comment, supra note 80, at 126 n.91.
189. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 651 (1981) (Bren-
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much more than this. A notion of de facto eminent domain labels
as a taking any governmental action benefitting the public which
results in destruction of the use and enjoyment of significant inter-
ests in private property. 190 The Supreme Court has long main-
tained that "the Constitution measures a taking of property not by
what a State says, or by what it intends, but by what it does."' 9'
Thus, the taking analysis may be satisfied even though TEX-IOTA
is not proposed or enacted as a taking measure because the reach
of the fifth/fourteenth amendments is not limited to announced,
intentional takings.9 2 The legislature may not think it is exercising
the taking power, but if the power in fact has been exercised, the
measure will be evaluated by its true nature and effect. 93
There are few absolutes in this area beyond the core of sover-
eign condemnations of land. TEX-IOTA would involve only the in-
terest on the trust account funds, namely, a temporary profit from
use of the money. While a governmental deprivation of the right to
use and obtain a profit does not automatically establish a taking, it
is very relevant.9 4 The issue is whether "'justice and fairness' re-
quire that economic injuries caused by public action be compen-
sated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately
concentrated on a few persons." 9 5 Justice Holmes characteristi-
cally preached a healthy pragmatism for both taker and takee. The
individual takee must acknowledge "that the constitutional re-
quirement of compensation when property is taken cannot be
pressed to its grammatical extreme; that property rights may be
taken for public purposes without pay if you do not take too much;
nan, J., dissenting) (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954)).
190. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 653 (1981) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
191. Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 298 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring). See
also Davis v. Newton Coal Co., 267 U.S. 292, 301 (1925) (incantation not of controlling im-
portance; primary concern is accomplishment).
192. "Its purpose, more particularly, is to protect... use and possession of property
from arbitrary encroachment-to minimize substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations of
property .... " Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972). See Webb's Fabulous Pharma-
cies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980); Carey v. Piphies, 435 U.S. 247, 259-60 (1978).
193. Hulen, supra note 75, at 206 n.36.
194. Compare Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 102 S. Ct. 3164
(1982) (installation of cables pursuant to New York law requiring landlord's consent consid-
ered a taking) with Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (prohibition of sale of avian arti-
facts not a taking as owner retains substantial, though not most profitable rights).
195. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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that some play must be allowed to the joints if the machine is to
work." 96 At the same time, the government taker must recognize
that the play in the joints "must have its limits, or the .. .due
process clauses are gone [and] private property disappears."997
We count nine separate theories of taking9" and we probably
have missed some.199 Of the nine, five apply to TEX-IOTA 00
First, the physical invasion approach defines a compensable taking
whenever government "occupies, uses or in some manner takes
physical possession" of the private property.2 0' A "forced contribu-
tion" of the earnings of the trust account funds which is not rea-
sonably related to the costs of administering the accounts obvi-
ously passes this test.2 02 Second, the noxious use test holds the
government immune from compensation claims when the private
use prevented is harmful to the public health, safety, or morals.20 '
To suggest that a client's earning of interest on trust accounts falls
within this category would be to return to the days when earning
interest was a sin. Third, the diminution in value theory allows
government diminishment of existing private property interests
without compensation so long as the government does not destroy
all or substantially all of the value of the property.20 4 TEX-IOTA
196. Tyson & Bros. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 445-46 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
197. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413, 415 (1922).
198. Our laundry list is taken from Berger, supra note 91, at 170-95. He evaluates the
economic usefulness of the various formulations. We do not. Texas adds another dimension
to this. The Texas Constitution proscribes not only taking but also damaging property with-
out adequate compensation. TEx. CONST. art I, § 17. The Texas Supreme Court refuses to
differentiate between an exercise of police power and eminent domain and provides compen-
sation when the cost of community benefits is not distributed impartially among all mem-
bers of the community. E.g., Steele v. City of Houston, 603 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. 1980); City of
Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. 1978); Du Puy v. City of Waco, 396 S.W.2d 103
(Tex. 1965); San Antonio River Auth. v. Lewis, 363 S.W.2d 444 (Tex. 1963); Brazos River
Auth. v. City of Graham, 163 Tex. 167, 354 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1962).
199. For helpful background discussion of just what is taking, see Kratovil & Harrison,
supra note 56, at 599-604; Mercer, supra note 119, at 185-90; Michelman, supra note 57, at
1184-1201; Sackman, supra note 111, at 183-87.
200. Four theories in Professor Berger's list do not apply to TEX-IOTA: the spillover
theory is limited to real property, Berger, supra note 91, at 179-82; the cheapest cost avoider
economic test is applied in the pollution context, id. at 185-91; the developments right
transfer approach is applied to zoning and land use regulation, id. at 191-93; the first-in-
time approach is applied to the equity notion of coming to the nuisance, id. at 193-95.
201. Id. at 170-71.
202. See Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 163-65 (1980).
203. Berger, supra note 91, at 172.
204. Id. at 175.
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does not take the principal in trust accounts, which would destroy
all the value when the property is money.2"' Interest on money,
however, is substantially all the value in possessing money and
when all interest is taken the destruction is complete. Fourth, the
enterprise-arbitral theory distinguishes between two types of gov-
ernmental functions.2 6 In its enterprise functions, government
performs its public welfare missions, while by its arbitral functions
government resolves disputes between private parties. Government
must pay its own way in the former, but not in the latter. TEX-
IOTA could be characterized as an arbitral function in deciding
the competing claims of the client and designated private founda-
tion to trust account interest upon its creation. This seems too fac-
ile, however, since the purposes behind TEX-IOTA and the crea-
tion of a fund where none had existed are such obvious examples
of government providing for our general welfare. Fifth, a blend of
economics and philosophy would decide what is a taking by consid-
ering a calculus of efficiency gains, demoralization costs, and settle-
ment costs.2 07 The three factors in this theory point in opposite
directions when applied to TEX-IOTA. The excess benefits for
those groups helped by the TEX-IOTA funding exceeds the small
amounts lost by individual clients so that gains are efficient if we
do not aggregate both sides of the equation. Demoralization of cli-
ents and attorneys over TEX-IOTA may be insignificant, although
public relations would have to be handled gingerly.208 The settle-
ment costs, the time, effort, and resources required to reach com-
pensation settlements and avoid demoralization (the costs of allo-
cating the interest to the clients) would be substantial, assuming
that available technology is inadequate.20 Under this approach, we
are not sure whether compensation in TEX-IOTA would be effi-
cient and just and therefore required.
We must conclude that if a government actor is the taker, and
205. Interestingly, the Australian plan which originated the IOTA concept requires a
portion of the trust to be transferred to the law society. Comment, supra note 16, at 543-44.
Of course neither Australian nor Canadian jurisdictions are burdened with due process con-
siderations such as are discussed in this article. Id. at 544, 547.
206. Berger, supra note 91, at 177-78.
207. Id. at 182-85.
208. The cover of the February 1982 issue of The Florida Bar Journal is an example.
It shows a check made out to "The People of Florida" for "The Public Good" and is signed
"Concerned Members of the Florida Bar."
209. But see supra note 38.
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if trust account interest is property, then the TEX-IOTA transfer
is a taking under these various approaches. Making the program
mandatory and declaring private foundation ownership of the
newly created property cannot make a taking something else. "[A]
State, by ipse dixit, may not transform private property into pub-
lic property without compensation, even for [a] limited duration
... . 210 Such a "simple fiat" would be a taking.'
Once government takes private property the taking must have
a public purpose."'2 The public purpose limit on taking is tanta-
mount to the legitimate government purpose required to satisfy
due process."" No one could seriously argue that funding legal ser-
vices for the poor, client security accounts, and improved client
grievance procedures are beyond the ken of the government." 4
On the other hand, the fifth/fourteenth amendment require-
ment that the takee be compensated does act as an effective limit
on the taking power.2 The constitutional phrase "just compensa-
tion" has left to the courts the task of providing content.216 The
210. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980).
211. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 102 S. Ct. 781, 798 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Still,
the de minimis doctrine may be applied again, although it more aptly enters property analy-
sis. Some governmental frustrations of property rights do not amount to takings in recogni-
tion of "the universal understanding of the people when the constitutions were adopted that
participation in the protection and other benefits which an organized government affords is
the only compensation to which an individual is entitled for the interference with certain of
his property rights." 2 J. SACKMAN, supra note 63, § 6.1, at 6-5. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 181-82. See also Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 110 (1911) ("compara-
tively insignificant taking"); Interstate Consol. St. Ry. v. Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79, 87
(1907) ("the infliction of some fractional and relatively small losses").
212. The doctrine has been chronicled mostly to trace its denouement and explain its
desuetude. See F. BOSSELMAN, D. CLLd us & J. BANTA, supra note 128, at 256-65; Dunham,
supra note 56, at 65-71; Hulen, supra note 75, at 208-16; Lavine, supra note 56, at 380-81;
Sackman, supra note 111, at 181-83; Stoebuck, supra note 97, at 588-89; Note, Balancing
Public Purposes: A Neglected Problem in Condemnation, 35 ALB. L. REV. 769 (1971); Note,
The Public Use Doctrine: "Advanced Requiem" Revisited, 1969 L. & Soc. ORDER 688; Note,
Public Use-Why and What, 3 WIUAmErrE L.J. 11 (1964); Note, The Public Use Limita-
tion on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599 (1949). Texas jurispru-
dence has its own counterpart. See Thx. CONST. art. I, § 17.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 89-93.
214. Comment, supra note 16, at 540-41.
215. The just compensation requirement prevents the taker from taking any more
than it can pay for. Hulen, supra note 75, at 212-13.
216. See 2 L. ORGEL, supra note 98, § 246, at 251-61; E. RAMs, VALUATION FOR Emi-
NENr DOMAIN (1973); Hale, Value to the Taker in Condemnation Cases, 31 COLUM. L. REV.
1 (1931); McCormick, The Measure of Compensation in Eminent Domain, 16 MINUN. L. Rv.
461 (1933).
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theory behind the clause is the just share; a citizen should be re-
quired "to bear no greater cost of government than other citi-
zens."217 The government may not force individuals to bear a bur-
den which should be borne by the public as a whole.2 i8 At a
minimum, the Constitution requires the individual's compensation
so that economically he is placed in the same position as if the
property had not been taken21 9 The requirement "is not precatory:
once there is a 'taking,' compensation must be awarded. 220
In TEX-IOTA the amount of just compensation is the same
measured by either of the two mutually exclusive theories-the
owner's loss or the taker's gain.2  What the client/owner lost is
exactly the amount that the taker/government gained: the amount
of interest earned on the trust account.22 2 It is easy to see that the
just compensation requirement, if applicable because TEX-IOTA
is a taking, makes the program unfeasible. This is true because ec-
onomic redistribution is itself the purpose of the government's in-
tervention.2 2- At least this is so if the deprivation involved is not so
de minimis as to be not entitled to compensation.2 2
The only remaining alternative to just compensation in the
taking analysis is the takee's consent.2  Very often, a state statute
The Texas Constitution phrase "adequate compensation" has been held synonymous to
"just compensation" under the Federal Constitution. See State v. Hale, 96 S.W.2d 135, 141
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1936), modified on other grounds, 136 Tex. 29, 146 S.W.2d 731
(1941).
217. Stoebuck, supra note 97, at 584.
218. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 656 (1981) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
219. Dunham, supra note 56, at 91. See Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v.
United States, 409 U.S. 470, 473-74 (1973); United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16
(1970).
220. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 654 (1981) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). See Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, 84-85 (1962); Jacobs v.
United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16 (1933).
221. Kratovil & Harrison, supra note 56, at 615-20.
222. See Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
223. Michelman, supra note 57, at 1181. See Beckwith v. Webb's Fabulous Pharma-
cies, Inc., 394 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 1981).
224. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 102 S. Ct. 3164, 3183 n.6
(1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "[To insist on full compensation to every interest which
is disproportionately burdened by a social measure dictated by efficiency would be to call a
halt to the collective pursuit of efficiency." Michelman, supra note 57, at 1178.
225. The power to take is itself best viewed as a power delegated to a citizen's repre-
sentatives to transfer property rights on the condition of just compensation. See Stoebuck,
supra note 97, at 572-88.
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requires a bona fide effort by the government to procure a volun-
tary conveyance as a condition precedent to the exercise of the
taking power.2 26 Waiver is a concept basic to constitutional law.
Just as an individual may waive general constitutional protec-
tions,227 the assurance of just compensation may be waived. The
government, however, may not arbitrarily declare a blanket waiver
or consent for a taking.228 While attractive from the standpoint of
taking jurisprudence, client consent apparently is not a real solu-
tion to the taking issue in TEX-IOTA. If clients were given notice
and informed of an option to participate, the program would be
rendered ineffective because of the tax problem. It seems that if
TEX-IOTA effects a taking there may be no practical way to go
forward with the program and follow the dictates of the fifth/four-
teenth amendments.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have raised more questions than we have answered, which
is the luxury of commentators. Our purpose, however, is not to
suggest answers. Rather, we have endeavored to raise constitu-
tional questions too long avoided or ignored. We must never lose
sight of our basic charter, no matter how laudable the purpose or
how pressing the need. We have suggested the framework for de-
bate but have not sided with one viewpoint or the other nor have
we made a prediction of the outcome on many of these issues. Our
humble hope is that our study will set the agenda and describe the
contours of constitutional debate over TEX-IOTA. That will be
enough. Our concern is not how these issues will be decided, but
that they receive the attention and consideration they demand. A
wise decision on TEX-IOTA requires nothing less. "Without ade-
quate study there cannot be adequate reflection. Without adequate
reflection there cannot be adequate deliberation and discussion.
And without these, there cannot be a full interchange of minds
which is indispensable to a wise decision and its persuasive formu-
226. Hulen, supra note 75, at 214-16.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 77-78; Comment, supra note 80, at 129.
228. Cf. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 102 S. Ct. 781, 791-92 (1982) (State of Indiana did not
act arbitrarily in passing a statute which provided that a severed mineral estate automati-
cally terminated unless the owner took steps to establish his continuing interest in the
property).
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lation."229 We have made the study. It is time for reflection, delib-
eration, discussion, and, it is hoped, a wise decision.
229. Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, 485 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., reservation).
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APPENDIX A*
A BILL TO BE ENTITLED
AN ACT
Relating to the use of interest from funds in certain trust accounts
held by attorneys.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE
STATE OF TEXAS SECTION I. Title 14, Revised Statutes, is
amended by adding Article 317a to read as follows:
Art. 317a. INTEREST ON TRUST ACCOUNTS HELD BY
ATTORNEYS
SEC. 1. FINDINGS: PURPOSE
The Legislature finds that on certain client trust accounts held
by attorneys, interest income cannot reasonably be earned to bene-
fit individual clients but can and should be used to provide addi-
tional legal aid to the indigent in civil matters, to improve the ad-
ministration of justice for other law related programs which benefit
the public.
SEC. 2. RULES
The Supreme Court shall promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to implement this Act. Such rules shall provide for the
formation of a corporation, incorporated under the non-profit cor-
poration laws of Texas to be the recipient and disbursing agent for
the funds hereinafter mentioned. In addition to such rules and reg-
ulations as may be promulgated by the Supreme Court which shall
provide for its formation and operation, such corporation shall at
all times meet the following requirements:
(a) The corporation shall be an organization qualifying as tax
exempt under the Internal Revenue Code.
(b) The exclusive purposes of the corporation shall be to pro-
vide legal services to the indigent in civil matters; to improve the
administration of justice; and to provide for such other law related
programs for the benefit of the public as are specifically approved
* After the submission of this article, a copy of a proposed TEX-IOTA statute was
circulated to members of the Client Protection Committee. This draft of October 26, 1982,
may differ slightly from that actually presented to the State Bar, but time constraints dic-
tate that a point of reference be chosen.
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from time to time by the Supreme Court for exclusively public
purposes.
(c) The corporation shall be governed by a Board of Directors
composed of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the President
of the State Bar, and such other persons as may be provided for by
the Supreme Court. At least one third (1/3) of the members of such
Board of Directors shall be nonlicensed attorneys, who do not
have, other than as consumers, a financial interest in the practice
of law.
(d) Amounts expended by the corporation for legal services to
the indigent may not be used for any case or matter that, if under-
taken on behalf of an indigent person by an attorney in private
practice, reasonably may be expected to result in payment of a fee
for legal services from an award to a client, from public funds,
from the opposing party, unless it is determined that adequate le-
gal services would otherwise be unavailable.
(e) Neither the corporation nor any project funded by it shall
take any action or require any attorney to take any action in viola-
tion of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
(f) The records of the corporation, including applications for
funds, whether or not granted, shall be open for public inspection
subject to such rules and regulations as the Supreme Court may
promulgate.
(g) The corporation may expend funds for the actual adminis-
trative costs of the program including any costs incurred after the
adoption of this Act and may provide a reasonable reserve for ad-
ministrative costs.
SEC. 3. CLIENT FUNDS
An attorney or law firm, which, in the course of the practice of
law in Texas receives or disburses client trust funds, shall establish
and maintain an interest bearing demand trust account and shall
deposit therein all client funds that are nominal in amount or are
on deposit for a short period of time. All such client funds may be
deposited in a single unsegregated account. The interest earned on
all such accounts shall be paid in accordance with and used for the
purposes set forth in this Act. Funds to be deposited under this
Act do not include those funds evidenced by banking instruments
such as drafts, until such instruments are fully credited to the
bank in which the trust account is maintained.
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SEC. 4 DEPOSITORIES
An attorney who, or a law firm which, establishes an interest
bearing demand trust account pursuant to Sec. 3 hereof, shall com-
ply with all the following provisions:
(a) The interest bearing trust account shall be established
with a bank or such other financial institution as shall be author-
ized by the Supreme Court.
(b) The rate of interest payable on any interest bearing de-
mand trust account shall not be less than the rate paid by the de-
pository institution to regular depositors. Higher rates offered by
the institution to customers whose deposits exceed certain time or
quantity qualifications, such as those offered in the form of certifi-
cates of deposit, may be obtained by an attorney or law firm so
long as there is no impairment of the right to withdraw or transfer
principal immediately (except as accounts generally may be subject
to statutory notification requirements), even though interest may
be sacrificed thereby.
(c) The depository institution shall be directed to do all of the
following:
(1) To remit not less than quarterly interest on the average
daily balance in the account, less reasonable service charges, to the
corporation described in Sec. 2 of this Act.
(2) To transmit to the said corporation with each remittance a
statement showing the name of the attorney or law firm for whom
the remittance is sent, the rate of interest applied, and the amount
of service charges deducted, if any.
(3) To transmit to the depositing attorney or law firm at the
same time a report showing the amount paid to the said corpora-
tion for that period, the rate of interest applied, the amount of
service charges deducted, if any, and the average daily account bal-
ance for each month of the period for which the report is made.
SEC. 5. ATTORNEY LIABILITY
An attorney shall not be liable to any person for depositing
client funds in accordance with Sec. 3 hereof unless such action is
taken recklessly or in bad faith. Nothing contained in this Act
shall affect the obligations of attorneys with respect to client trust
funds other than client trust funds reasonably determined by the
responsible attorney to be nominal in amount or on deposit for a
1983]
TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW
short period of time.
SEC. 6. CORPORATE LIABILITY
In the event client funds are improperly deposited in the ac-
count provided for in Sec. 3, that is, client funds which are neither
nominal in amount nor on deposit for a short period of time, the
liability of the corporation in such event shall be limited to the
amount of interest attributable to such client funds actually paid
by the depository to the corporation.
SEC. 7. EFFECTIVE TIME
Secs. 3 and 4 shall not take effect until the first day of the first
month that begins more than ninety (90) days after a ruling is ob-
tained from the Internal Revenue Service that the program author-
ized by this Act will not result in taxable income to clients whose
funds are included in the program.
SECTION 2.(a) The Supreme Court may appoint a commis-
sion to:
(1) prepare and publish a preliminary drafts [sic] of the rules
and regulations;
(2) distribute the draft with notices of public hearings to com-
mercial banking institutions and potential fund recipients; and
(3) hold public hearings in which interested parties are af-
forded an opportunity to present oral or written testimony regard-
ing the rules and regulations.
(b) The program authorized by this Act shall become opera-
tive only after the Supreme Court has promulgated and adopted
rules and regulations to conform the program to applicable tax and
banking statutes, regulations, and rulings.
(c) The initial distribution of funds under this Act shall be
made at a time when, in the determination of the Supreme Court,
there are sufficient funds to provide an adequate distribution.
SECTION 3. The importance of this legislation and the
crowded condition of the calendars in both houses create an emer-
gency and an imperative public necessity that the constitutional
rule requiring bills to be read on three several days in each house
be suspended, and this rule is hereby suspended.
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Florida
1. Authorization
2. Lawyer
involvement
APPENDIX B
California
Supreme court-
Integration Rule
11.02(4)(d)
Voluntary
3. Client funds Funds "nominal in
involved amount or to be held
for a short period of
time"
4. Notice to or
consent of client
required
No client consent
required; notice
provision specifically
removed
Legislature-Business
& Professional Code
§§ 6210-6228
Mandatory, but law-
yer has sole responsi-
bility for determining
eligibility of funds
for criterion 3
Funds "nominal in
amount or are on
deposit for a short
period of time"
No client consent
required; notice
provision specifically
removed
Maryland
Legislature
Voluntary
Funds which will
generate less than $50
interest per year
No client notice or
consent required
5. Income tax Not included in
consequences income of attorney or
client by virtue of
Rev. Rule 81-209
6. Recipient of Florida Bar
funds Foundation
7. Authorized uses Legal aid to poor,
student loans,
improving the
administration of
justice, and such other
programs for the
benefit of the public
as the supreme court
approves
No revenue ruling yet No revenue ruling yet
obtained obtained
State Bar of
California
Legal services to the
indigent
Maryland Legal
Services Corp.
Legal services to the
indigent
374
1983]
Idaho
Supreme court-
amending DR 9-102
Voluntary
Funds "nominal in
amount or to be held
for a short period of
time"
No client notice or
consent required
No revenue ruling yet
obtained
Idaho Law Foundation
Not specified in rule
TEX-IOTA
Texas (Proposed)
Supreme court as
directed by legislature
Mandatory
Funds "nominal in
amount or to be held
for a short period of
time"
No client notice or
consent required
No revenue ruling yet
obtained
Not yet determined
Legal aid to the poor,
improving the
administration of
justice, and other
programs for the
benefit of the public as
the supreme court
approves

